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PLAYING WITHOUT ACES: OFFSETS AND THE LIMITS
OF FLEXIBILITY UNDER CLEAN AIR ACT CLIMATE POLICY
BY NATHAN RICHARDSON *

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
continues to move ahead with regulation of greenhouse gas emissions
under the Clean Air Act (CAA). Previous work has indicated that basic
forms of compliance flexibility—trading—appear to be legally
permissible under section III of the CAA. This Article takes a close look
at more expansive and ambitious types of flexibility: trading between
different kinds of sources, biomass co-firing, and above all, offsets. It
concludes that most types of such extended flexibility are either legally
incompatible with the CAA, or so legally problematic that EPA is
unlikely to adopt them. This has important implications for both the
costs of the CAA climate policy and the level of environmental benefits
that are achievable. It also creates tension between the CAA climate
policy and state-level policies, such as California’s, that aim to include
various forms of extended flexibility.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Supreme Court’s 2007 Massachusetts v. U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (Massachusetts v. EPA)1 decision and the 2009–2010
failure of cap-and-trade in Congress, the Environmental Protection Agency

1

549 U.S. 497, 528–29 (2007).
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(EPA)—under the authority of the Clean Air Act (CAA)2—has become the
sole vehicle for federal climate policy. But that authority is limited: EPA’s
freedom to design and implement climate policy is constrained by the scope
of its powers under the CAA.3 Although critics’ claims that regulating
greenhouse gases (GHGs) under the CAA will be a “train wreck” are
overblown,4 CAA climate policy does require compromises. But which ones?
This Article tries to answer a key part of that question, specifically: Can EPA
allow emissions trading, offsets, and other flexibility mechanisms for the
power plants, refineries, and other existing “stationary sources” whose
carbon emissions the agency will soon regulate under the CAA?
EPA’s climate policy program under the CAA may have reached the end
of its beginning, due to the recent proposal of the first regulations limiting
GHG emissions from the biggest class of emitters: existing fossil fuel power
plants.5 Limits for existing fossil power plants, and for both new and existing
sources in other sectors will follow.6 Future existing-source regulations
come via a rarely used and relatively poorly understood part of the CAA:
performance standards under section 111(d).
Can these performance standards be flexible, allowing emitters to
trade, or does the CAA require EPA to issue rigid, one-size-fits-all standards?
To put it differently, does section 111(d) give EPA the authority to
implement a modern, market-based policy for GHGs? The answer is
critically important for both the economic costs and the environmental

2

42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006).

3

See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984).
See Op-Ed., More Hot Air from the White House, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2008,

4

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/22/opinion/22iht-edwarming.1.12230349.html (last visited July
14, 2012) (quoting Bush administration press secretary referring to GHG regulation under the
CAA as a “regulatory train wreck”); see also AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, EPA’S REGULATORY
TRAIN WRECK: STRATEGIES FOR STATE LEGISLATORS vi–vii (2011), available at http://www.alec
.org/docs/EPA-TRAIN-WRECK-2011-Final-Full-printres.pdf (characterizing a suite of recent and
near-future EPA regulations, including those on GHGs, as a “train wreck”). For a brief
counterargument to the “train wreck” position, see Nathan Richardson et al., The Return of an
Old and Battle-Tested Friend, the Clean Air Act, 176 RESOURCES 24, 29 (2010), which argues that
CAA regulation of GHGs can be effective, at least over the short term.
5 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 430-R-12-001, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2010, AT ES-6, ES-12, ES-15, 3-1 (2012), available at http://www.epa.
gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-Main-Text.pdf; Standards
of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392 (proposed April 13, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
60); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ELECTRIC UTILITY STEAM GENERATING UNITS SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT 3–4 (2010) [hereinafter Boiler Settlement Agreement], available at http://epa.
gov/carbonpollutionstandard/pdfs/boilerghgsettlement.pdf (requiring EPA to promulgate a
proposed rule under section 111(b) to regulate electric utility steam generating units (EGUs));
infra Part II.B.
6 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PETROLEUM REFINERIES SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 4–5
(2010), Am. Petroleum Inst. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 08-1227 (D.C. Cir. 2010), [hereinafter
Refinery Settlement Agreement], available at http://epa.gov/carbonpollutionstandard/pdfs/
refineryghgsettlement.pdf (noting EPA’s obligation to publish a proposed rule regulating
petroleum refineries under the NSPS program); AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, supra note 4, at
20; infra Part II.B.
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benefits of the program.7 In the most basic sense, the answer appears to be
yes. Independent legal observers and EPA have both concluded that section
111 does allow EPA to give emitters “compliance flexibility” up to and
possibly including the authority to impose a cap-and-trade system across the
entire regulated sector. 8
But this is only part of the answer. There is more to flexibility than the
ability to trade with other similar emitters, power plant to power plant. Most
comprehensive climate policies, both actual and proposed, allow trading
with other kinds of emitters, maybe even those in other jurisdictions.9 They
also allow regulated emitters to buy offsets from those that are not covered,
or from projects that cut atmospheric carbon in other ways, such as by
preserving or planting forests.10 These forms of flexibility matter: expanding
emissions markets by adding dissimilar emitters increases the opportunities
for low-cost emissions cuts, and offsets may be the cheapest carbon-cutting
opportunity of all.11

7 See DALLAS BURTRAW ET AL., RES. FOR THE FUTURE, DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 11-30, RETAIL
ELECTRICITY PRICE SAVINGS FROM COMPLIANCE FLEXIBILITY IN GHG STANDARDS FOR STATIONARY
SOURCES 7, 22–23 (2011), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-11-30.pdf
(analyzing cost impact of flexibility in implementation of CAA performance standards and
finding that one option, a tradable performance standard, reduces overall costs by two-thirds
by 2020).
8 See GREGORY WANNIER ET AL., RES. FOR THE FUTURE, DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 11-29,
PREVAILING ACADEMIC VIEW ON COMPLIANCE FLEXIBILITY UNDER § 111 OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 1–2
(2011), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-11-29.pdf (identifying areas of
consensus—and lack thereof—regarding the legality of different policy options under §111(d),
and specifically concluding that basic compliance flexibility is probably permissible). EPA
made similar arguments in 2005 and 2008. See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the
Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 44,490 (proposed July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
ch. I) (“As EPA has interpreted the NSPS [new source performance standards] requirements in
the past with respect to certain air pollutants, we believe that the NSPS program could use
emissions trading, including cap-and-trade programs and rate-based regulations that allow
emissions trading, to achieve GHG emission reductions.”); Standards of Performance for New
and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606,
28,606, 28,616 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 72, 75) (May 18, 2005) (establishing
nationwide cap-and-trade program for mercury emissions under section 111 of the Clean
Air Act).
9 See, e.g., WANNIER ET AL., supra note 8, at 8; Teresa B. Clemmer, Staving Off the Climate
Crisis: The Sectoral Approach Under the Clean Air Act, 40 Envtl. L. 1125, 1135 (2010); Ctr. for
Climate & Energy Solutions, Regional Initiatives, http://www.c2es.org/what_s_being_done/
in_the_states/regional_initiatives.cfm (last visited July 14, 2012).
10 See JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34436, THE ROLE OF OFFSETS IN A
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM: POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND CONCERNS 3, 5–
6 (2008); Maria Savasta-Kennedy, The Newest Hybrid: Notes Toward Standardized Certification
of Carbon Offsets, N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 851, 860–61 (2009).
11 The potential economic value of carbon offsets has been comprehensively analyzed. In
2009 the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the EPA performed a
comprehensive analysis of congressional proposals for regulating GHGs with a cap-and-trade
system. EPA found that the availability of international offsets would lower the marginal cost of
emissions reduction from $50 to $26. See LARRY PARKER & BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R40809, CLIMATE CHANGE: COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE CAP-AND-TRADE
PROVISIONS OF H.R. 2454, at 47, 47 tbl.8 (2009), available at http://www.cnie.org/NLE/
CRSreports/09Sept/R40809.pdf.
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This Article attempts to determine whether EPA can take advantage of
any of these “extended flexibility” opportunities under section 111. For some
opportunities, the answer appears to be yes: EPA probably can, for example,
allow trading between different kinds of emitters (“source categories”). But
for most types of extended flexibility, unfortunately, significant legal
barriers exist. For international forest offsets—probably the most costeffective option—these barriers appear insurmountable.
Part II of this Article discusses the basics of EPA’s CAA regulations for
GHGs, while Part III defines and discusses the different types of flexibility
available under climate policy. Part IV forms the core of the Article,
analyzing the legal compatibility of CAA and section 111 regulation with
these flexibility mechanisms. Part V then discusses implications for states,
some of which have independent climate policies. Conclusions are
presented in Part VI.
II. EPA’S CLIMATE REGULATIONS
Before discussing the scope of flexibility under EPA’s section 111
regulations, it is important to at least briefly describe where the agency is,
how it got there, and the legal foundations of its program. In short, as of late
2011, EPA was well on its way to implementing a broad set of policies aimed
at reducing GHG emissions in the U.S. with its authority under the existing
CAA.12 On April 13, 2012, the agency formally proposed the much-anticipated
carbon emission performance standards for new power plants, but it has not
yet detailed its plans for existing sources, the primary subject of this paper.13

A. The Clean Air Act and Carbon
Two events led to EPA’s predominant role in national climate policy. In
2007, the Supreme Court concluded in Massachusetts v. EPA that carbon is a
pollutant subject to regulation under the CAA.14 In 2009, it appeared possible
that Congress would pass legislation creating a new national climate policy
and preempt the existing CAA, most likely in the form of economy-wide capand-trade—but these efforts ultimately failed in the Senate.15 These two
developments have together left the regulatory burden squarely on
EPA’s shoulders.

12 See, e.g., 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 76 Fed. Reg. 74,854 (proposed Dec. 1, 2011) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 533, 536, 537) (proposing heightened greenhouse gas
emissions and fuel economy standards for light-duty vehicles manufactured between 2017
and 2025).
13 Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392 (proposed April 13, 2012) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
14 549 U.S. 497, 528–29 (2007).
15 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
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Under the Bush administration after Massachusetts v. EPA, the agency
investigated pathways for GHG regulation, issuing a lengthy public analysis,16
but it did not move to actually regulate any GHG emissions sources. Under
the Obama administration, EPA has moved relatively aggressively to use its
CAA authority.17 The agency has made a formal endangerment finding for
GHGs (enabling their regulation under the CAA),18 strengthened regulation
of tailpipe emissions from vehicles,19 included GHGs in the permitting
process for large new or modified emitters,20 and, as noted above, proposed
GHG performance standards for most new fossil fuel power plants.

B. The Knowable Pathway
Until recently, EPA’s plan for regulating GHG emissions from existing
stationary sources—the power plants and industrial facilities responsible for
the majority of U.S. emissions—was completely unknown. In December
2010, EPA revealed its general plan: in a settlement agreement with states
and environmental groups that had sued the agency shortly after
Massachusetts v. EPA, the agency announced that it would use a specific
tool under the CAA—performance standards under section 111—to limit
stationary-source emissions.21 Still, much remains unclear, even after the
agency’s April 2012 proposal of standards for new sources. Given the
magnitude of the emissions at stake, EPA’s program for these sources will
probably be the most important part of its GHG regulatory program.
As noted above, EPA’s choice of regulatory program for new and
existing stationary sources appears to be performance standards.22 Under
section 111 of the CAA, the agency first defines categories of similar emitting
sources (“source categories”). 23 For new sources under section 111(b), the
agency sets a performance standard based on the “best system of emission
reduction.”24 These new sources are then required to meet the level of

16 See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354,
44,354, 44,490 (proposed July 30, 2008).
17 See Jonathan H. Adler, Heat Expands All Things: The Proliferation of Greenhouse Gas
Regulation Under the Obama Administration, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 421, 422, 440–42 (2011).
18 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R ch. I).
19 See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel
Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,327 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 533, 536, 537).
20 See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75
Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71).
21 See Refinery Settlement Agreement, supra note 6; Boiler Settlement Agreement, supra
note 5; see also Proposed Settlement Agreement Notice, Clean Air Act Citizen Suit, 75 Fed. Reg.
82,392, 82,293 (Dec. 30, 2010) (providing notice of the settlement agreements as a result of
threatened litigation over EPA’s failure to establish GHG standards for fossil fuel power plants
and petroleum refineries). For more information about these settlement agreements and the
parties involved, see http://www.epa.gov/airquality/cps/settlement.html.
22 See supra Part I.
23 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b) (2006).
24 Id. § 7411(a)(1).
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emissions (or some other measure, such as efficiency) set by the standard, 25
though they are not required to use any specific technology to do so.26 It is
this set of standards that the agency proposed in April 2012, setting a
stringent 1,000 lbs CO2/MWh standard that effectively bans construction of
new coal plants, at least without carbon-capture-and-storage technology.
The process for existing sources under section 111(d) is similar, but for
these sources EPA only sets guidelines, whereas states are charged with
setting and implementing the standards—subject to EPA review.27 In
practice, the process is likely to be collaborative, with EPA possibly issuing
a model rule that states may adopt.28 Traditionally, the section 111(b) New
Source Performance Standards (NSPS) process has been technology-driven
and has applied uniformly to all new sources within each category, without
much flexibility.29 However, section 111(d), which addresses performance
standards for existing sources—which I will call Existing Source
Performance Standards (ESPS)—has rarely been used at all.30
III. WHAT FLEXIBILITY MEANS
Much remains unclear about these future ESPS. Some of the questions
are procedural: Will other categories of sources eventually be covered? How
much latitude will EPA give to states in implementing ESPS? And some are
substantive: How stringent will the performance standards be?

A. Flexibility, Benefits, and Costs
But possibly more important than stringency is flexibility: How much
compliance flexibility can or will be granted to emitters that must comply
with the standards? In other words, is trading allowed, and if so, with

25

Id. § 7411(b)(4).
Id. § 7411(b)(5).
27 Id. § 7411(d)(1).
28 See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, NO State Implementation Plan (SIP) Call for the MidX
Atlantic States, http://www.epa.gov/reg3artd/specprog/NOx/sip_call.htm (last visited July 14,
26

2012) (noting that EPA provided a model rule that states could voluntarily adopt to come into
compliance with the agency’s Nitrogen Oxide (NOX) emission reduction requirements).
29 See DALLAS BURTRAW, ARTHUR G. FRAAS & NATHAN RICHARDSON, RES. FOR THE FUTURE,
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. DP 11-08, GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT: A
GUIDE FOR ECONOMISTS 4–6 (2011), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-1108.pdf.
30 See generally DALLAS BURTRAW, ARTHUR G. FRAAS & NATHAN RICHARDSON, TRADABLE
STANDARDS FOR CLEAN AIR ACT CARBON POLICY, 1, available at http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/
RFF-DP-12-05.pdf (discussing how the “tradable standards” regulatory tool found in CAA
Section 111 is a legal and politically viable means of regulating emissions from coal plants and
petroleum refineries); see also Nathan Richardson et al., Greenhouse Gas Regulation under the
Clean Air Act: Structure, Effects, and Implications of a Knowable Pathway, 41 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,098, 10,105–06, 10,109–12, 10,115 (2011), (discussing generally the requirements under
section 111(d)); WANNIER ET AL., supra note 8, at 3–4 (noting that although section 111 gives
EPA several tools to utilize in regulating emissions from source categories, courts have yet to
directly answer the most relevant questions).
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whom? Because carbon is a global pollutant, it generally does not matter
where emissions cuts come from: reducing smokestack emissions from
a U.S. coal plant, a similar plant abroad, or avoiding deforestation in
the Amazon.31
These extended flexibility tools are usually viewed as cost-containment
mechanisms.32 Offsets, especially those available from international forestrelated projects, appear to be among the lowest-cost opportunities for GHG
reduction.33 They might also be classed as environmental tools.34 Because
section 111 requires EPA to consider costs in setting performance standards
(or at least in determining how long emitters have to comply),35 reducing
costs and achieving environmental goals are two sides of the same coin.
Achieving similar environmental benefits for a lower cost is beneficial in its
own right and may increase political flexibility for the agency. But reducing
costs may also enable the agency to justify more aggressive environmental
goals. Some tools may also have environmental side benefits: forest offsets
could help stop biodiversity loss, or reductions in carbon emissions from
sources outside the section 111 standards could lead to reductions in other
pollutants emitted from those sources—although reducing emissions at
covered sources might also have other benefits that would be sacrificed if
reductions happen elsewhere instead.36
For these reasons, and despite the focus on cost-reduction effects in
this Article, it is important to understand these tools in environmental as
well as economic terms. And, of course, the entire point of having a
regulatory program for GHG emissions is to promote environmental goals.
Some previous work has looked at flexibility under section 111 in a
general sense; that is, whether section 111 is compatible with relatively
simple trading between emitters in the same source category subject to the
same performance standards.37 EPA and most observers appear to feel that
31 Actions with the same CO2-equivalency are indistinguishable from a climate perspective,
but not necessarily for other purposes. Actions have other costs and benefits not related to
climate that should be weighed as well.
32 Franz T. Litz et al., What’s Ahead for Power Plants and Industry? Using the Clean Air Act
to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Building on Existing Regional Programs 22–23
(Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Climate Change Law & World Res. Inst. Working Paper, 2011),
available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/null/download?&exclusive=filemgr.download&file
_id=542077.
33 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
34 See generally infra Part III.B.
35 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2006).
36 See Sarah A. Berkessy & Brendan A. Wintle, Using Carbon Investment to Grow the
Biodiversity Bank, 22 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 510, 510 (2008). It is also true that some tools
could result in environmental harms. Some claim that the use of biomass for energy could
increase the demand for forest products, with negative consequences for biodiversity, for
example. See id. This, along with skepticism about the carbon benefits of offsets or biomass, is
the source of opposition to these tools in some circles, discussed in more detail below. See infra
Part IV.F.
37 See Robert A. Nordhaus, New Wine Into Old Bottles: The Feasibility of Greenhouse Gas
Regulation Under the Clean Air Act, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 53, 56–57 (2007) (examining the most
commonly considered GHG control options: command-and-control regulations, a cap-and-trade
scheme, and a GHG tax).
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the statute does permit this.38 Scholars have applied relatively little analysis
to extended flexibility. Assuming that at least some flexibility for future
sources is available under section 111, how much can EPA allow emitters to
trade with other sectors, buy offsets, or receive credit for other carboncutting actions?
In short, extended flexibility matters, but a lack of legal analysis makes
it unclear whether and to what extent these tools are compatible with
climate policy under the CAA, and specifically with section 111 performance
standards. This Article is an attempt to fill this gap.

B. Types of Flexibility
Flexibility can come in many forms, and because the legal analysis
differs significantly among the various forms, it is helpful to clearly
distinguish each one. “Offsets” in particular is a broad term that can refer to
many different types of activities, from paying a nearby cement plant to
reduce its emissions to buying credits for avoided deforestation in faraway
tropical regions.39 Instead of basing analysis on such ambiguous terms, it is
more useful to concretely describe different types of flexibility. As shown in
Figure 1, this Article discusses five different types of flexibility.
An emitter subject to section 111 performance standards (or any
emissions restriction) can either reduce its own emissions to comply, or
trade with others that make an equivalent contribution—if the regulator
allows.40 These five types of flexibility categorize the different groups with
which an emitter could, in principle, be allowed to trade. From Type 1
through Type 5, the source of emissions credits the regulated emitter is
allowed to use becomes more distant conceptually (and often
geographically). The types are divided not by geography, but by the law of
section 111. Each successive type of flexibility is affected by additional legal
barriers, as discussed in the following sections.41 These legal barriers are not
necessarily interdependent, but generally speaking, if one class of flexibility
is incompatible with the statute, more “distant” types will probably also be
unavailable.

38
39

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
See ROSS W. GORTE & JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34560, FOREST

CARBON MARKETS: POTENTIAL AND DRAWBACKS 1 (2010).
40 See LITZ, supra note 32, at 2; Nordhaus, supra note 37, at 64.
41 See infra part IV.
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Figure 1. Types of Flexibility, with Examples

To help explain the different types of flexibility, consider a hypothetical
coal-fired power plant subject to EPA performance standards. It must
reduce its emissions, improve its efficiency, or do whatever is required by
the performance standard—or if an emissions trading program is in effect, it
may be able to purchase some form of credits created when someone else
takes some kind of GHG-cutting action.
Type 1. Recall that NSPS and ESPS are set for defined source
categories.42 If any compliance flexibility at all is available, sources will be
able to trade with others in the same source category.43 Our coal plant could,
for example, buy credits from a similar plant that improved its efficiency or
reduced its emissions more than required by the performance standard. This
is Type 1 flexibility.

42
43

See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
See Nordhaus, supra note 37, at 65–66 (raising the question of whether EPA would have

the authority to combine source categories together, rather than administering a cap-and-trade
program for each separate category).
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Type 2. Another possibility is that sources could be permitted to obtain
credits from emitters in other source categories that have their own
performance standards.44 For example, our coal plant could buy credits from
an oil refinery, for which standards are also scheduled to be issued by the
end of 2012 (although meeting this date appears increasingly unlikely). This
trading with other sources covered under section 111, but in different source
categories, is Type 2 flexibility.
Type 3. Emissions reductions could also occur at stationary sources
that are not currently subject to any section 111 performance standard, and
these reductions could be another source of credits for regulated emitters.45
Our coal plant could, for example, buy credits from a cement plant that
reduces its emissions. Trading with stationary sources that do not yet have
section 111 GHG performance standards is Type 3 flexibility.
Type 4. CAA section 111 applies only to domestic stationary sources.46
But emissions reductions are equally valid whether they come from those
sources, from sectors outside the reach of section 111 such as vehicles or
agriculture, or from stationary sources abroad. Our coal plant could, for
example, buy credits from a farm that reduces its methane emissions, or
from a similar coal plant in another country. Such trading with extra-CAA
(or at least extra–section 111) sources is Type 4 flexibility. This is a broad
category, and analysis is somewhat different for sources that fall outside
section 111’s definition of “stationary” and for those sources that do fit the
definition but are outside its domestic jurisdiction.47 For this reason, I
analyze the two separately.
Type 5. The ultimate goal of climate policy is to reduce atmospheric
concentrations of GHGs and, thereby, reduce the likelihood of dangerous
climate change.48 Reducing emissions at a source subject to section 111
standards, or at any of the other sources discussed in Type 1–4 flexibility,
achieves this goal directly. When emissions from any source decrease, the
rate at which atmospheric carbon is increasing also goes down, all other
things being equal.49 But this is not the only way to reduce GHG
concentrations in the atmosphere. It is also possible to remove—or
sequester—carbon that is already there.50 Though technological
44
45
46

See id.
See infra notes 104–05 and accompanying text.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (“Standards of performance for new stationary sources”); see also

infra notes 137–41 and 145–47, and accompanying text.
47 See infra Part IV.D.1., D.2.
48 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/
conveng.pdf.
49 See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Brodeen, Sequestration, Science, and the Law: An Analysis of the

Sequestration Component of the California and Northeastern States’ Plans to Curb Global
Warming, 37 ENVTL L. 1217, 1218–20 (2007) (discussing carbon sequestration as the only viable
option in removing CO2 from the atmosphere).
50 Id. Note that this is different from the sequestration required by carbon capture and
storage (CCS) projects. CCS captures carbon at the smokestack, thereby limiting or eliminating
a source’s emissions. Forest carbon sequestration, or sequestration geoengineering, removes
GHGs from the ambient atmosphere. Id. at 1221–23.
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sequestration projects have been suggested, 51 the primary tool currently
available is forest carbon sequestration. 52 Carbon sequestration and
emissions reduction are geophysically interchangeable. This means that a
climate policy can, in principle, treat the two as equivalent by allowing
emitters to purchase credits generated by sequestration actions taken
elsewhere. To give an example, our coal plant could obtain credits from
projects that plant trees (in California or possibly in Brazil). Such trading
with “sources” that do not reduce emissions, but rather atmospheric carbon
concentrations, is Type 5 flexibility.

C. Analyzing Flexibility Types
Using these defined types of flexibility is, I hope, clearer than using a
broad term like “offsets”, which can refer to flexibility Type 3, 4, or 5 or to a
combination of these types. The question of whether offsets are compatible
with section 111 performance standards has an ambiguous answer because
it depends on which type of flexibility one is referring to. The umbrella term
“offsets” works for other purposes because the three types are geophysically
interchangeable and come from a broad group of sources—those not subject
to emissions limitations under the primary program. But the differences
between the three types do matter legally.
IV. EXTENDED FLEXIBILITY UNDER SECTION 111 OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
This section presents a legal analysis, that attempts to assess the
compatibility of each type of flexibility with EPA regulation via section 111
performance standards. The analysis focuses almost exclusively on
flexibility options for existing, rather than new, sources. This is partly
because of legal and practical complications with trading that includes new
sources, 53 but also because the emissions of existing sources are far greater
than those of new sources, at least over a reasonable time horizon. 54 This
means that any market for emissions allowances will be much larger for
existing sources, and that a combined new/existing market will probably be
dominated by existing sources.
As noted above, some existing scholarship has analyzed basic—that is,
Type 1—flexibility under section 111. 55 Another small body of work has

51

Id. at 1223.
Id. at 1221–22.
53 See WANNIER ET AL., supra note 8, at 5–7.
54 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GREENHOUSE GAS REPORTING PROGRAM: 2010 DATA
PUBLICATION 2 (2012), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/ghgdata/
52

index.html (showing that the majority of GHG emissions are from power plants); Jonathan
Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental Regulation: The Law and
Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1707–18 (discussing how
regulations regarding modifications of existing sources may actually operate to extend the
lifespan of older, dirtier, power plants which contribute disproportionately to emissions).
55 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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examined Type 2 flexibility.56 For this reason, Types 1 and 2 will be briefly
discussed and will reference these existing works.

A. Type 1 Flexibility: Other Sources in the Same Category
Regulation under section 111 is driven by source categories.57 EPA is
charged with defining a list of categories of stationary sources that “cause[],
or contribute[] significantly to” air pollution that endangers public health or
welfare, and with revising that list as necessary.58 For each category, the
agency must issue performance standards; it does so first for new sources,59
then, if a pollutant is not regulated under other major stationary-source CAA
programs, EPA issues guidelines on which states will base similar standards
for existing sources.60 Source categories and subcategories defined by the
agency are differentiated mostly by economic sector and by technology.61
For example, the categories for which EPA recently issued GHG
performance standards are those for “electric utility steam generating
units”62 (primarily coal plants) and eventually a set of six subcategories
covering different classes of petroleum refineries.63
Type 1 flexibility refers to the ability of sources regulated under section
111 performance standards to trade within these categories. Must every
coal plant reduce its emissions or improve its efficiency as required by
the standard, or can these plants trade with each other, with the
underperforming plants buying allowances from those that exceed
the standard?
Both EPA itself and most scholars who have examined this question
appear to have concluded that at least some such Type 1 flexibility is
available.64 In fact, this generally has been what observers mean when they
claim that section 111 allows for flexibility.

56 See WANNIER ET AL., supra note 8, at 8 (discussing the possibility of trading between
source categories).
57 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b) (2006)
58 Id. § 7411(b)(1)(A).
59 Id. § 7411(b)(1)(B).
60 See id. § 7411(d).
61 See generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (2011) (listing over 90 source categories).
62 See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22392 (proposed April 13, 2012) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); see also Boiler Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, at 1
(referencing 40 C.F.R. pt. 60, subpart Da).
63 See Refinery Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, at 1, 4 (referencing 40 C.F.R. part 60,
subparts J, Ja, Db, Dc, GGG, and QQQ).
64 See, e.g., WANNIER ET AL., supra note 8, at 4–5 (citing academic and EPA authorities). But

see Strengths and Weaknesses of Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Using Existing Clean
Air Act Authorities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the H. Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. 11–14 (2008) [hereinafter Hearing] (including the
testimony of Lisa Heinzerling, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center), available
at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/images/stories/Documents/Hearings/PDF/110eaq-hrg.041008.Heinzerling-Testimony.pdf (arguing that, among other reasons, the technological
focus of section 111 implies that a trading system is incompatible with its design).
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1. Flexibility: The “Best System”?
The most frequently cited grounding for Type 1 flexibility in section 111
is in the statute’s definition of performance standards: “The term “standard
of performance” means a standard for emissions of air pollutants which
reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application
of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost
of achieving such reduction) the Administrator determines has been
adequately demonstrated.”65
The argument in favor of Type 1 flexibility is that this definition gives
EPA discretion to determine the “best system” for reducing emissions,
considering cost, from a source category. The agency could therefore
conclude that allowing sources flexibility to trade within that category is the
“best system” or at least the best possible approximation of it, given the
structure of section 111.66
There is some precedent for this approach, most notably under the 2005
Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR), in which EPA adopted a cap-and-trade
system for mercury pollution from coal plants.67 There, the agency similarly
relied on the section 111(a)(1) definition of “standard of performance”:
The term ‘‘standard of performance’’ is not explicitly defined to include or
exclude an emissions cap and allowance trading program. In the final rule, EPA
interprets the term ‘‘standard of performance,’’ as applied to existing sources,
to include a cap-and-trade program. This interpretation is supported by a
careful reading of the section 111(a) definition of the term, quoted above: A
requirement for a cap-and-trade program (i) constitutes a ‘‘standard for
emissions of air pollutants’’ (i.e., a rule for air emissions), (ii) ‘‘which reflects
the degree of emission limitation achievable’’ (i.e., which requires an amount of
emissions reductions that can be achieved), (iii) ‘‘through application of (a)
system of emission reduction’’ (i.e., in this case, a cap-and-trade program that
caps allowances at a level lower than current emissions). Nor do any other
provisions of section 111(d) indicate that the term ‘‘standard of performance’’
68
may not be defined to include a cap-and-trade program.

The agency further argued that a separate definition of “standard of
performance” in section 302(l) does not conflict with this interpretation.69
The agency’s rationale applies with equal force whether it chooses to
implement cap-and-trade itself or some other, less ambitious emissions
trading program, such as a tradable performance standard.70 Almost any

65

42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).
WANNIER ET AL., supra note 8, at 4–5.
67 Clean Air Mercury Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 28606 (May 18, 2005) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60,
72, and 75).
68 Id. at 28,616–17.
69 Id. at 28,617.
70 For a discussion of a tradable performance standard, see Richardson et al., Greenhouse
66

Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: Structure, Effects, and Implications of a Knowable
Pathway, supra note 30, at 10,114–15; see also BURTRAW ET AL., supra note 7, at 3–5 (comparing
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such program could be characterized as a “system of emission reduction,”
leaving EPA only to nonarbitrarily determine that it is the “best” system, or
that it at least “reflects” the emissions reductions possible under the
best system.
Though the CAMR interpretation of section 111 and its scope for
flexibility was questioned by some parties at the time,71 it was not tested
legally because the rule was rejected by courts on unrelated grounds.72 EPA
reiterated the plausibility of this approach in the GHG context in 2008.73 This
area of law remains unsettled, but several observers believe that some form
of trading is legally permissible via the “best system” language.74

2. Counterarguments to Type 1 Flexibility as the “Best System”
One counterargument to flexibility under section 111 is grounded in a
1978 D.C. Circuit decision, Asarco v. EPA.75 The holding in this case prevents
EPA from using a “bubbling” approach in CAA performance standards—that
is, EPA is not allowed to redefine “facilities” for regulatory purposes to
include multiple physical facilities, thereby allowing averaging of emissions
across those physical installations.76 Superficially, this might appear to rule
out flexibility across sources within a category (Type 1) as well. The set of
sources across which trading is permitted could be characterized as simply a
very large bubble because, although the set as a whole would meet the
prescribed standard, no individual facility would necessarily do so. If this
characterization is correct, Asarco could rule out Type 1 flexibility.
This appears unlikely, however, for two reasons. First, Type 1 flexibility
would be built into EPA’s section 111 GHG program from its outset, unlike
bubbling in the rulemaking that the Asarco court considered. In other words,
if EPA includes trading, not by altering its working definition of what a
facility is, but by finding that trading is itself the “best system of emission
reduction,” Asarco and its limitations would not apply. Both moves would
involve somewhat creative interpretation of CAA language, but “best system
of emission reduction” is arguably more ambiguous than “facility”—and
therefore it would be harder for a judge to find that it has a plain meaning
that courts are qualified to identify. In legal terms, this probably gets the
agency beyond step one of a Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.

other regulatory policies, including flexible compliance and inflexible standard, with the capand-trade approach).
71 Hearing, supra note 64, at 11–13.
72 N.J. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 517 F.3d 574, 583–84 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (vacating the CAMR
rule on the grounds that EPA had improperly delisted mercury from §112 of the CAA).
73 Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44354 (July
30, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1) (discussing and soliciting comments on EPA
regulation of GHG emissions from a variety of other sources, including ships, aircraft, nonroad
vehicles, and stationary sources).
74 See WANNIER ET AL., supra note 8, at 4–5.
75 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
76 Id. at 326–27.
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Council, Inc. analysis,77 and if so, greatly increases the chances that its
interpretation will survive a challenge.
Chevron itself provides a second reason why Asarco might not apply—
because Asarco was decided well before Chevron, the agency might now be
entitled to greater discretion to interpret the language of the CAA where, as
here, it appears to be ambiguous. If this is correct, not only Type 1 flexibility,
but also the bubbling practice at issue in Asarco might be permissible.
Another counterargument to Type 1 flexibility is that including it
misinterprets the “best system” language in section 111(a). This language,
the counterargument goes, guides EPA in determining a performance
standard’s stringency, but does not necessarily allow the agency to adopt
that system via section 111 regulation. In other words, standards are
intended to “reflect” the “best system,” not to be the best system. Another
related counterargument is that compliance flexibility stretches the meaning
of “system” to the breaking point in what has traditionally been a
technology-focused process.78
Assuming that these counterarguments do not prevail, EPA and the
states—being charged with setting ESPS under section 111(d)—can include
Type 1 flexibility in their performance standards.79

3. States’ Independent Powers
A separate route that would allow Type 1 flexibility for existing sources
under section 111(d) is based on the role of states, which may allow them to
include Type 1 flexibility under section 111(d) standards for existing sources
even if EPA itself cannot. This argument is grounded in the procedure for
section 111(d) regulation: EPA sets national guidelines that the states
implement via “a procedure similar to that provided by section 110 under
which each State shall submit to the Administrator a plan which (A)
establishes standards of performance . . .and (B) provides for the
implementation and enforcement of such standards of performance.”80
The reference in the first sentence is to the State Implementation Plan
(SIP) process under section 110 of the CAA.81 This is part of the National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) program, in which EPA similarly
sets standards that states implement and enforce.82 The SIP process is
extensively detailed in section 110 and is quite flexible. Notably, state SIPs
can include “economic incentives such as fees, marketable permits, and

77 467 U.S. 837 (1983). In Chevron, the Supreme Court held that agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutory language prevail unless they are not “reasonable” or “permissible.” Id. at
842-43. The question of ambiguity is step one, and that of reasonableness of interpretation is
step two. Id.
78 This is similar to the argument advanced by Professor Heinzerling in her 2008 testimony.
Hearing, supra note 64, at 8–10.
79 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2006).
80
81
82

Id.
Id. § 7410(a).
Id. §§ 7409–7410.
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auctions of emissions rights.”83 Although offsets are not explicitly mentioned,
it can be argued that this grant, particularly the “economic incentives”
language, is sufficiently broad to include Type 1 flexibility. Further, the
argument goes, if offsets are in principle permissible under section 110 SIPs,
then states can also implement them under the “similar” section 111(d)
procedure. Though admittedly complex, this argument is appealing and
has a firmer grounding in the statute than many of the other
pro-offset arguments.
However, the substantive flexibility granted to states under section 110
may not be fully incorporated into section 111(d). Section 111(d)’s reference
to section 110 does not permit either the states or EPA, in its approval
process, to ignore the requirements of section 111 itself. The language
quoted above from section 111(d) indicates that, whatever the section 110like “procedure” for EPA and state cooperation, the submitted plan must
establish, implement, and enforce “standards of performance.”84 This puts us
back where we started: the definition of “standards of performance” in
section 111(a), including the “best system” language.
Put differently, the reference in section 111(d) to a process similar to
the State Implementation Plans under NAAQS is purely procedural, not
substantive. The substantive limits of section 111(d) regulations are
determined not by section 110, but by section 111, and whatever flexibility
exists must be found there. As noted above, section 111(a) defines
“standards of performance” as based on the “best system of emission
reduction.”85 Any type of flexibility under section 111 performance standards
must fit within this definition, regardless of what section 110 has to say
about flexibility under NAAQS. The argument in favor of offsets based on
the states’ role therefore collapses into the argument discussed in the
previous section—whether “best system” itself can be interpreted to include
offsets. If this interpretation of section 111(d) and its reference to section
110 is correct, that reference either grants no substantive flexibility, or any
flexibility granted is superfluous.

4. The Scope of Type 1 Flexibility
Even if an argument for Type 1 flexibility based on section 111(d)’s
analogy to section 110 is relatively weak, the primary argument that the
“best system” language in section 111(a) allows Type 1 flexibility remains
strong. It is this argument that both EPA and most scholars have relied on in
concluding that Type 1 flexibility is permissible.86
How far could EPA and the states go with Type 1 flexibility? In
principle, it might be able to create a cap-and-trade program for entire

83
84

Id. § 7410(a)(2)(A).
Id. § 7410(c) (requiring each State to submit to EPA a procedure for implementing and

enforcing the new source performance standards).
85 See supra Part IV.A.1.
86 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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source categories, as it attempted to do in the 2005 CAMR,87 but this appears
highly unlikely for GHGs, largely for political reasons.88 More modest
market-based mechanisms, such as a tradable performance standard based
on efficiency improvements, have been suggested.89

B. Type 2 Flexibility: Other Regulated Source Categories
Even CAMR—the high point of ambition for flexibility under section
111 to date—did not extend that flexibility beyond a single source category.
For GHGs, EPA will eventually need to issue standards for a wide variety of
categories, from cement plants and steel mills, to other heavy industrial
facilities. The agency has already proposed standards for electric utility
generating units.90
The agency could not approximate an economy-wide carbon policy by
regulating all U.S. GHG emissions under section 111 because some types of
GHG sources—such as vehicles and most agricultural operations—do not fit
the statute’s definition of “stationary source”.91 Nevertheless, expanding
flexibility across source category boundaries would make trading markets
more effective.92 If the most cost-effective emissions reductions among
sources regulated under section 111 come from one source category,
regulation that allows sources outside that category to trade with sources
inside it will be cheaper for the same level of overall emissions.
Observers have considered whether EPA has authority under section
111 to allow trading across source categories, which this Article defines as
Type 2 flexibility.93 Their tentative conclusion is that it does appear to be
possible to allow such flexibility, for at least three reasons. First, there is no
statutory preclusion, presumably because the drafters of section 111 did not
explicitly consider any form of flexibility. But neither is there any clear
statutory authority.94

87 See Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Steam Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606, 28,606, 28616 (May 18, 2005) (proposing a cap and
trade system under the definition of “standard of performance”).
88 See Gabriel Nelson, EPA Promises to Avoid Cap, But Some Utilities Want Trade, E&E
NEWS, Feb. 4, 2011, http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2011/02/04/archive/2?terms=gabriel
=nelson (last visited July 15, 2012) (quoting EPA assistant administrator Gina McCarthy as
disavowing cap and trade as an option the agency is considering under the CAA).
89 See Richardson et al., Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: Structure,
Effects, and Implications of a Knowable Pathway, supra note 30 at 10114–10115; see also
BURTRAW ET AL., supra note 29, at 293, 304–08; BURTRAW ET AL., supra note 7, at 3–5.
90 Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22392 (proposed April 13, 2012) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
91 See infra Part IV.D.; Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3) (2006).
92 WANNIER ET AL., supra note 8, at 3.
93 Id. at 8.
94

Id.
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Second, the agency’s categorization powers may allow it to achieve the
practical equivalent of Type 2 flexibility.95 As noted above, the agency has
the authority to revise source categories and create subcategories as it sees
fit—it may “distinguish among classes, types, and sizes within categories.”96
This probably allows EPA to expand existing categories, and possibly to
create new “supercategories” encompassing multiple existing categories and
relegating those existing categories to subcategory status.97 In this case, it
would further appear to be able to define performance standards specific to
each subcategory, but allow flexibility across the entire supercategory.98 This
flexibility would technically be Type 1, but in practice would be equivalent
to Type 2.
There is no precedent for such a recategorization, and much less for the
Type 2 flexibility it may enable. Nevertheless, this route appears legally
plausible, and no conflict with any provision of section 111 is apparent.99
Finally, section 111(d) itself does not appear to require states to
regulate via source categories at all. Sources are subject to section 111(d)
regulation if: (a) their emissions of the pollutant in question are not
regulated elsewhere in the Act, and (b) they would be subject to section
111(b) NSPS if they were new sources.100 This means that section 111(b)
regulation and the source category definitions that drive it define the scope
of possible section 111(d) regulation. But section 111(d) itself makes no
mention of source categories. It does not require states issuing performance
standards for existing sources to base those standards on the same category
definitions used by EPA, or any such category definitions at all. It appears
that all the states must do is regulate the sources that fall under section
111(d), using “standards of performance” as defined in section 111(a). If this
reading is correct, then Type 2 inter-category flexibility is well within the
scope of authority granted to the states. Nor does anything in the statute
prevent EPA from approving a set of state performance standards allowing
Type 2 flexibility, or from writing a model rule for states to adopt that
includes such flexibility.

95 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(2) (2006) (allowing the agency to “distinguish among classes, types,
and sizes within categories of new sources”).
96
97

Id.

WANNIER ET AL., supra note 8, at 8.
A related question is whether the agency can create and/or revise source categories for
GHG purposes while leaving them intact for purposes of regulating other pollutants under
existing performance standards. The answer appears to be yes. The agency currently uses a
long list of source categories at 40 C.F.R. part 60 that are not mutually exclusive—in other
words, overlap between categories is tolerated, and therefore new GHG-specific categories,
supercategories, and subcategories do not appear problematic. In addition, nothing in section
111 restricts EPA’s authority to define and redefine source categories as it sees fit, or implies
that the same categories must be used for all pollutants.
99 Just because intercategory trading is apparently legal does not mean that it is simple.
Trading across different sectors subject to regulations of differing stringency and design could
prove administratively complex and/or susceptible to manipulation, especially if EPA eschews
quantity-based standards (tons of GHGs emitted) in favor of standards based on efficiency
improvements or other measures.
100 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (2006).
98
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C. Type 3 Flexibility: Unregulated Source Categories
If EPA can allow regulated sources to trade within their own categories
(Type 1) and possibly with other categories (Type 2), what about emissions
sources that are not regulated under section 111 standards at all? Some of
these sources might not have section 111 GHG standards because EPA has
not yet issued them but could issue such standards in the future. Trading
with these kinds of sources is Type 3 flexibility and is discussed in this
section. Other sources might not have standards because they are outside
the reach of section 111 entirely. Trading with these sources is Type 4
flexibility and is analyzed in the next section.
Type 3 flexibility is the first type of flexibility considered here that
could be described as a form of offset. If sources inside the section 111
regulatory program are permitted to trade with GHG sources (even
temporarily) outside of it, they are offsetting their emissions via cuts in
unregulated emissions elsewhere.
At first impression, it might appear that Type 3 flexibility is a narrow
category with limited practical importance. If source categories that do not
currently have section 111 standards account for a large volume of GHG
emissions, EPA could simply issue standards for them.101 And if those
sources have relatively low-cost opportunities to reduce those emissions—
making them viable sources of credits—issuing standards makes those
credits available as Type 2 flexibility, rather than Type 3.
However, the standard-setting process takes time, particularly for
existing sources under section 111(d), which requires every state to issue its
own standards.102 Standards are issued for different source categories at
different times, according to a schedule of regular reviews.103 Each standard
is subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking and, possibly, to litigation.
Flexibility that includes sources in different stages of this process may
therefore be important.
The discussions of Type 1 and Type 2 flexibility in the previous sections
have shown two general tools for incorporating flexibility: EPA’s powers
over source category definitions may allow Type 2 to be incorporated, and
the “best system of emission reduction” language in the statute’s definition
of performance standards may also incorporate Type 1 flexibility. Both tools
may be useful in reaching for Type 3 flexibility.

1. Converting Type 3 into Type 2 Flexibility
As noted above, once EPA issues performance standards for a source
category, potential trading with sources in that category becomes Type 2,
rather than Type 3, flexibility.104 Because Type 2 flexibility appears

101
102

Id. § 7411(b)(1)(B).
Id. § 7411(d)(1).

103 Every eight years, as prescribed by section 111(b)(1)(B). States may also petition for
interim revisions for a variety of reasons. See id. § 111(g).
104 See supra Part IV.B.
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compatible with section 111, doing this would effectively make Type 3
flexibility compatible as well. But, as noted above, EPA and the states
cannot quickly issue and implement substantive standards for all source
categories that emit GHGs.105 If there were a way to shorten this process,
however, EPA might be able to at least temporarily achieve Type 3 flexibility
in practice.
One option for doing so would be for the agency to issue “paper”
performance standards for categories that it believes would be useful
sources of cost-effective emissions cuts. These standards could be minimally
stringent, such that any reductions in emissions achieved by sources in the
category could be immediately converted into credits for use by sources that
are the primary target of section 111 regulation, presumably those in the
energy and refining sectors. Over time, EPA could then issue revised, more
stringent standards for those categories as the agency completes its
technical analysis and regulatory process.
For example, if EPA issues standards requiring emissions reductions
from fossil power plants, but wants to allow those plants to obtain credits
from reductions made at cement plants, it could issue a paper or pro forma
performance standard for cement plants, under which virtually any
emissions reductions would be available for trading. More stringent
standards for cement plants would then follow in the future.
But this process works only if EPA can issue minimally stringent
performance standards more quickly than it can issue fully formed
standards. It does not appear that the agency can do so. Even though
technical analysis would be simpler, the agency would still have to follow
notice-and-comment procedures, including mandatory periods for public
comment and Office of Management and Budget review.106 Thus, large parts
of the rulemaking process are duplicated under this scheme. Paper
standards would also be vulnerable to litigation. Environmental groups
would almost certainly sue, claiming that EPA’s decision to issue lax
standards for a given source category violates its obligations under section
111 because such standards arbitrarily would not reflect the “best system of
emission reduction” for that category. Given these downsides, EPA
would probably be better off using its limited resources to develop
defensible standards for sectors it believes can achieve low-cost GHG
reductions, rather than rushing to include those categories via regulatory
sleight-of-hand.

2. Pure Type 3 Flexibility
If converting Type 3 into Type 2 flexibility is not legally permissible, or
at least not practical, could EPA allow Type 3 flexibility directly? It appears
possible, albeit unlikely. The reasons are complex, and analyzing Type 3
flexibility forms the heart of this Article.

105

See supra Part IV.C.

106

42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B) (2006).
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a. Section 111 Does Not Rule Type 3 Flexibility Out—or In
The first and simplest argument in favor of Type 3 flexibility is that
neither the CAA in general, nor section 111 in particular, expressly forbid it.
In fact, they give EPA a lot of flexibility in program design.107 As noted,
section 111 does not mention any form of compliance flexibility, much less
specifics about whether sources can trade with emitters not subject to their
own performance standards. EPA may therefore be relatively free to
interpret the statute in favor of such flexibility, with substantial deference
from federal courts under Chevron.108 Recall that under Chevron deference,
unless EPA’s interpretation is contradicted by the plain language of the
statute (step one) or, much less likely, is deemed unreasonable (step two),
that interpretation prevails.109
Using congressional failure alone to explicitly exclude something from
EPA’s grant of authority is not enough to reach the deference available in
Chevron step two. Agencies cannot create powers out of whole cloth, but
rather must ground them in the statute. When they do so, that
interpretation—if challenged—is subject to scrutiny by courts. In other
words, pointing to the fact that Congress has not forbidden EPA to consider
offsets under section 111 is a necessary first step, but it is far from enough.
This approach does not indicate the statutory source of EPA’s authority to
use offsets, much less whether interpretation of that source to allow offsets
is valid.

b. Parallels Elsewhere in the Clean Air Act
A second argument in favor of Type 3 flexibility is that Congress’s
inclusion of something similar to Type 3 flexibility elsewhere in the CAA
shows that offsets are broadly compatible with the statute and that Congress
was aware of their advantages, particularly when regulation threatens to
impose large costs.
Offsets are not unknown in CAA regulation, having been formally
included since the 1977 amendments to the statute—albeit in limited
fashion.110 These well-established CAA offsets, or “emissions reduction

107 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–554 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(d) (2006); see also Lignite Energy Council v. EPA, 198 F.3d 930, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(noting that EPA has “considerable discretion under section 111”).
108 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Coucil, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).
109 See id. at 843–44.
110 See Jan Peter Voß, Innovation Processes in Governance: The Development of ‘Emissions
Trading’ as a New Policy Instrument, 34 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 329, 333 (2007), available at http://
docserver.ingentaconnect.com/deliver/connect/beech/03023427/v34n5/s3.pdf?expires=13316971
65&id=67736855&titleid=898&accname=Guest+User&checksum=B0CCC43FF55C2093CC43D2
C2F3EE1185 (noting that EPA incorporated the “bubble concept” from the early 1970s to
develop an offset mechanism in the 1977 amendments and establish the first “limited market for
emission rights”).
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credits” (ERCs) in CAA jargon, are part of NAAQS in section 110 of the Act
and are described below.111
For a permit to be issued for construction of a new emitting facility
where pollution levels exceed the NAAQS, the firm seeking the permit must
do two things. First, it must install tight emissions controls (to result in the
Lowest Achievable Emissions Rate, or LAER). 112 Second, it must offset the
residual emissions from the project, which can be done via ERCs.113 Firms
that verifiably reduce emissions obtain these credits and can either use them
for their own future projects or sell them to other firms seeking permits for
new projects.114 The ERC program is specified in the statute itself115—it is not
based on EPA interpretation of general pollution-control powers under
the CAA.
The ERC program has been widely used, but its reach is narrow. It is
relevant only in areas that are in “nonattainment” for (that is, failing to meet)
NAAQS.116 Even in those areas, offsets are not used as a general emissionscontrol policy tool, but only when preconstruction permits are needed.117
And even then, the ERC offsets required for the permit must be created
within the same nonattainment area.118 ERC offsets are best viewed as a
safety valve that prevents strict regulations on nonattainment areas from
completely shutting down economic growth rather than a general tool for
reducing compliance costs. In fact, they do little to reduce costs because
facilities still must comply with the underlying emissions regulations: LAER.
In reality, they are more like a very limited and idiosyncratic Type 2
flexibility than they are like Type 3 flexibility.
The presence of the ERC program in the CAA has conflicting
implications for the use of offsets under other CAA programs, including
those for GHGs. ERCs themselves are not a useful option for potential GHG
offsets under the CAA because it is unlikely that NAAQS will be set for
GHGs—EPA has chosen to use section 111, not section 110, as its primary
vehicle for stationary-source GHG regulation.119

111
112
113
114

See 42 U.S.C. § 7503(c) (2006).
Id. § 7503(a)(3).
Id. § 7503(c)(1).
See, e.g., Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Emission Reduction Credit Registry System, http://

www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/airwaste/aq/permits/erc/ercmain.pdf (last visited July 15,
2012) (giving a general overview of Pennsylvania’s ERC scheme, including how ERCs are
typically generated and transferred).
115 See 42 U.S.C. § 7503(c)(2) (2006).
116 Id. § 7503(c)(1).
117
118

See id.
Id. Offsets can also come from an upwind area—that is, another nonattainment area—if

emissions from that other area affect compliance in the area where the permit is being
sought. Id.
119 Robin Bravender, EPA Chief Signals Opposition to Clean Air Act Curbs on GHGs,
GREENWIRE, Dec. 8, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2009/12/08/4 (last visited
July 15, 2012) (quoting EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson: “I have never believed and this agency
has never believed that setting a national ambient air quality standard for greenhouse gases
was advisable”).
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Even if they are a poor analogy for hypothetical Type 3 flexibility under
section 111, ERCs at least superficially indicate that offsets are not in
principle incompatible with the CAA. One might try to take this further and
interpret ERCs as evidence that Type 3 flexibility under section 111 is
specifically compatible. But section 111 contains no parallel to the ERC
language in section 110. Congress demonstrated with the ERC program that
it was aware of the benefits of offsetting emissions and was capable of
crafting language that would specifically include them in EPA’s authority.120
Congress’s failure to do so elsewhere in the Act, notably under the
performance standard provisions in section 111, could therefore be
interpreted to indicate that it did not intend to grant such authority
anywhere else. This leads to a contrary interpretation of ERCs—their
presence in section 110 but not section 111 seems to imply that Congress did
not intend for EPA to have the authority to implement anything similar for
performance standards.
This expressio unius argument should not be taken too far.121 The CAA
is a flexible statute, with many different programs aimed at different
pollutants from different sources.122 EPA has a long history of interpreting
these programs relatively independently,123 strengthened by Chevron
deference,124 and an expressio unius argument that depends on
Congressional consistency throughout the statute is therefore not very
strong. It is difficult to argue that the scope of authority delegated to EPA
should be exactly the same for each CAA program, despite their wide
variation in aims and structure.
Nevertheless, an expressio unius argument based on ERCs probably is a
strong counter to the argument that the presence of offsets elsewhere in the
statute makes them compatible with section 111. In short, ERCs do not seem
to provide clear evidence either way on the question of whether offsets are
appropriate under section 111.

120

See H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 511–13 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 01077,

1473–1475.
121 Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is “[a] cannon of construction holding that to
express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 661 (9th ed. 2009).
122 For example, compare 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2006) (defining elements of the Clean Air Act’s
hazardous air pollutants program), with 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2006) (introducing emissions
standards program for motor vehicles).
123 See e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, The Clean Air Act at a Crossroads: Statutory Interpretation
and Longstanding Administrative Practice in the Shadow of the Delegation Doctrine, 9 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2000) (explaining that Congress gave EPA a fair amount of discretion to
interpret the CAA); See also Susannah Landes Foster, Note, When Clarity Means Ambiguity: An
Examination of Statutory Interpretation at the Environmental Protection Agency, 96 GEO L J.
1347, 1366–67 (2008).
124 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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c. The “Best System” and Type 3 Flexibility
A third argument for Type 3 flexibility is that, if EPA can include Type 1
(and possibly Type 2) flexibility as part of the “best system of emission
reduction,” that language similarly supports the inclusion of Type 3. EPA
can, the argument goes, declare the “best system” to be “trading plus
offsetting Type 3 flexibility” and be done with the issue—or at least get over
the Chevron step one bar. This might be correct, and is probably the
strongest legal argument for Type 3 flexibility under section 111.
Including both Type 1 and Type 3 via the “best system” language places
a heavy burden on that part of the statute—with implications for both the
courts’ view of EPA’s interpretation and the agency’s own tolerance for such
ambitious maneuvers. It is certainly not possible to rule out such a move for
Type 3 flexibility while still accepting it as a legally plausible justification for
Type 1, but including both based on the same statutory language would be a
particularly bold strategy. The agency has already indicated that Type 1
flexibility is available under section 111, and as such, may consider it to be a
higher priority than implementing Type 3.125 Its interpretation of the “best
system” language will therefore already be doing heavy lifting, and it may not
bear—or EPA may fear that it will not bear—the further strain of including
offsets. Identifying the “best system” as Type 1 and Type 3 flexibility—
trading and offsets—asks a lot of EPA general counsel and ultimately, given
the inevitable lawsuit, of courts.126 Nevertheless, this is at best informed
speculation. The only legal judgments that matter are those of the agency in
determining the initial scope of the program, and of the courts in
determining its final legal status.
Even if EPA does adopt Type 3 flexibility via the “best system”
language, a court could find grounds to reject it without threatening Type 1
flexibility. Type 3 flexibility, by definition, requires EPA to consider
emissions and/or carbon impact from sources that are not directly regulated
by performance standards.127 Asarco, discussed in Part IV.A.2 above, can be
viewed as restricting the ability of the agency to redefine the limits of the
“fence” within which emissions and standards compliance can be averaged
or traded. Identifying Type 1 flexibility as part of the “best system” allows
EPA to move the fence despite Asarco, but it does nothing to permit
inclusion of “outside-the-fence” facilities and resources, as required by Type
3 flexibility.
No CAA performance standard and no CAA program of any type has
allowed offsetting from such outside-the-fence sources. Language within the
statute neither readily supports such a move nor directly contradicts it.128

125
126

See supra Part IV.A.

This is especially true if EPA seeks to include international offsets, as courts are hesitant
to extraterritorially apply statutes in the absence of clear congressional intent. See infra
Part IV.D.1.
127 See supra Part III.B. (defining Type 3 flexibility).
128 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (2006). The statute gives EPA flexibility in design
programs under section 111, and courts tend to be deferential to the agency. See Part IV.C.2.a.
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Whatever ambiguities exist, section 111 is focused on regulating defined
source categories.129 Source categories are, in many ways, the defining
feature of section 111 regulation. Type 3 flexibility would ignore the “fences”
implicit in a source category approach, without even the veneer of
compatibility provided by using EPA’s recategorization powers, as suggested
above for Type 2 flexibility. A court might therefore conclude that Type 3
flexibility is incompatible with the general source category–driven structure
of section 111, even if it accepts the agency’s claim that such flexibility is a
reflection of the “best system”.

d. Type 3 Flexibility and States’ Independent Powers
Another argument is that states’ powers under section 111(d) may allow
them to provide existing sources with Type 3 flexibility, even if EPA could
not. This argument is largely identical to that discussed in Part IV.A.1. for
Type 1 flexibility, and suffers from the same flaws. Above all, section
111(d)’s reference to section 110 appears to be purely procedural, and does
not grant the authority to use substantive tools that are outside the section
111(a) definition of performance standards.
However, even if states’ section 110 powers are fully incorporated by
the section 111(d) “procedure similar” reference, they still might not include
Type 3 flexibility. As mentioned above, NAAQS already includes offsets—
ERCs—albeit indirectly, via preconstruction permitting in nonattainment
areas.130 Although the expressio unius argument based on ERCs is relatively
weak when applied to the CAA as a whole, it is somewhat stronger when its
scope is limited to NAAQS.131 ERCs would lose much of their significance if
states could allow emitters to broadly offset their emissions. On the other
hand, Congress might have been sufficiently concerned about costs in the
specific situation covered by ERCs (new sources in high-pollution areas) to
carve out an offset provision, while still intending to allow states discretion
over whether to use them more generally.132

3. The Case for Type 3 Flexibility
It is difficult to draw a definitive conclusion about the compatibility of
Type 3 flexibility with section 111 performance standards. The statute does
not clearly rule them in or out. Arguments based on parallels to ERCs under
NAAQS and those based on states’ powers under section 111(d) and section

129

See 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006).
See supra Part IV.C.2.b.
131 See supra Part IV.C.2.b.; Coal. for Clean Air v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 971 F.2d 219, 230 (9th
Cir. 1992) (Noonan, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that expressio unius applies to
130

provisions that survived the 1990 amendments).
132 See H.R., 91ST CONG., HOUSE CONSIDERATION OF THE REPORT FROM THE CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE, DECEMBER 18, 1970, at 112 (1970); S. COMM. ON ENV’T AND PUB. WORKS, 101ST CONG.,
SENATE DEBATE ON THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990 CONFERENCE REPORT, October 27,
1990, at 1053 (1990).
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110 do not offer much support and are in tension with each other.133 But the
core argument—analogous to that for Type 1 flexibility, that the offsets
made available by Type 3 are part of the “best system”—is at least
superficially strong. Nevertheless, the tension between the source category–
based design of section 111 and Type 3 flexibility may be hard for a court to
ignore. Type 3 flexibility by definition breaks through not only the barriers
between source categories but also those between sources inside and those
outside of section 111 entirely.134 This has no apparent precedent under any
section 111 regulation or indeed any CAA program.

D. Type 4 Flexibility: Extra–Clean Air Act Sources
The above discussion of Type 3 flexibility relates only to emissions
from sources that could be subject to their own section 111 performance
standards. But many sources of GHG emissions are entirely outside the
reach of section 111.135 Trading with these sources is Type 4 flexibility
because some sources are either located outside the geographic—and
apparently jurisdictional—reach of the CAA or are difficult or impossible to
classify into source categories at all, regardless of their location.136

1. International Sources
International sources appear to be outside the reach of section 111
regulation. Courts interpret statutes not to have extraterritorial application
unless there is evidence of congressional intent to the contrary.137 No such
evidence exists in section 111, and there is little elsewhere in the CAA to
indicate such intent.138 Even section 115 of the statute—which deals
specifically with emissions that have international health or welfare
impacts—limits regulatory authority to domestic pollutants, although it does
require that other countries give the United States reciprocal rights.139
Section 115 is the international emissions counterpart to NAAQS under
section 110,140 but section 111 performance standards have no such
counterpart.
International sources certainly could not be subject to direct emissions
limitations under section 111 because—even if it had extraterritorial reach—

133
134
135
136
137

See WANNIER ET AL., supra note 8, at 6.
See supra Part III.B.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.
See supra Part III.B (defining the different types of flexibility explored in this Article).
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130B S. Ct. 2869, 2873 (2010) (citing U.S. Equal

Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)) (“It is a
[‘]longstanding principle of American law [“]that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.[’”]
When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”).
138 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2006).
139 See id. § 7415(a)–(c).
140 See id. § 7415(a)–(b) (identifying section 7410 SIPs as the vehicle for implementation of
emissions reduction required under section 7415).
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the section contains no provisions for enforcement. Whether these sources
can benefit from section 111 regulation as suppliers of credits to those
sources that are subject to performance standards is more ambiguous. But
in practice it would be difficult, and perhaps impossible, for EPA to monitor
and enforce the emissions reductions behind such credits. Cooperation with
foreign governments would be necessary, and EPA has no legal authority to
negotiate such agreements and no experience in this area—though executive
agreements by the President or negotiated and ratified treaties might supply
this authority.141
Whatever EPA’s limitations, at least one state has moved ahead with
plans to include international sources in its independent program. California
has signed memoranda of understanding with states in Mexico and Brazil
that may eventually lead to forest offsets from those areas entering the
California program.142 Whether this policy will survive legal challenge is
unclear.143 States may generally have greater practical capability to
incorporate international sources in their programs—either in their
independent programs or in those required under section 111(d)—though
they also face additional legal barriers.144 The states’ role in section 111(d)
regulation is discussed in more depth in Part V below.

2. Nonstationary Sources
Even domestically, section 111 only applies to stationary sources,145 and
the source categories on which section 111 regulation is based can only
encompass stationary sources.146 As defined by section 111(a)(3), a
stationary source is “any building, structure, facility, or installation which
emits or may emit any air pollutant.”147

141 See e.g., U.S. CONST. art II, § 2 (authorizing the President to enter into treaties only with
consent of at least two-thirds of the Senate); American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396,
415 (2003) (“Our cases have recognized that the President has authority to make ‘executive
agreements’ with other countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate . . . this power having
been exercised since the early years of the Republic.”).
142 See Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Cooperation Between the State of
Acre of the Federative Republic of Braz., the State of Chiapas of the United Mex. States, and the
State of Cal. of the U.S. art. 2, Nov. 16, 2010, available at http://www.socioambiental.org/
banco_imagens/pdfs/Memorando_Acre_Chiapas_California_REDD_Nov_2010.pdf; see also
Margot Roosevelt, Chiapas to California: Preserving Forests for Dollars?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9,
2010, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/2010/12/cancun-climate-forests-carbon-trading
-california-chiapas.html) (last visited July 15, 2012).
143 See DANIEL F. MORRIS, NATHAN RICHARDSON, & ANNE RIDDLE, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, ISSUE
BRIEF 11-12, IMPORTING CLIMATE MITIGATION: THE POTENTIAL AND CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL
FOREST OFFSETS IN CALIFORNIA CLIMATE POLICY 1–2 (2011), available at http://www.rff.org/
RFF/documents/RFF-IB-11-12-%20(2).pdf.
144 See id. at 9–12 (noting that California’s carbon offset plan could be vulnerable to
challenges at the state level, federal regulatory level, and at a Constitutional level).
145 See generally Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006) (noting “[s]tandards of performance
for new stationary sources”) (emphasis added).
146 See id. § 7411(b) (stating that the EPA Administrator must publish “a list of categories of
stationary sources”).
147 See id. § 7411(a)(3).

TOJCI.RICHARDSON.DOC

2012]

8/14/2012 10:04 PM

PLAYING WITHOUT ACES

763

However, many sources of GHG emissions do not fit this definition,
including vehicles, many aspects of agricultural operations, and, most
importantly, forests. Forests certainly are not “buildings” or “facilities” and it
seems bizarre to call them “structures” or “installations” in anything but the
most abstract sense. The definition of “stationary source” seems to refer to
the built environment. If this is correct, it means that credits or offsets
generated by avoided-deforestation projects, whether domestic or
international, are outside the scope of section 111.

3. Barriers to Type 4 Flexibility
In short, Type 4 flexibility requires regulators—either the EPA or
states—to argue that section 111 allows trading not only with things that are
not currently regulated (Type 3 flexibility) but also with things that could
never be regulated under section 111 and are excluded from its scope.
Regulators would have difficulty arguing that these GHG sources are part of
the “best system of emission reduction,” and the argument exacerbates
tension with the source category–driven character of section 111 regulation
and the “fence” it creates. 148
Congress never intended section 111 performance standards to include
vehicle emissions, as mobile sources are dealt with elsewhere, under Title II
of the statute. 149 Congressional intent with respect to other classes of
“nonstationary” sources is less clear, but including such sources has no
precedent under any CAA Title I program.
A counterargument is that Type 4 flexibility does not require regulators
to “include” such extra–section 111 sources: it need not impose any
substantive emissions limitations on these sources, group them into any
source category, or otherwise make them a formal subject of section 111
regulation. All that is necessary is that they be considered a mechanism for
reducing emissions from sources that are regulated under section 111. These
regulated sources remain the focal point of CAA compliance, and they are
the ones that must be within the geographic scope of the Act’s application
and within the section 111(a)(3) definition of “stationary source.”
Notwithstanding this argument, however, Type 4 flexibility still faces
obstacles to implementation: it has no grounding in the statute outside of the
“best system” language, it remains in tension with the source category
design of performance standards, and creates significant practical problems
150
of monitoring and enforcement, particularly for EPA.

148 See supra Part IV.C.2.c, for a similar discussion of the tension between Type 3 flexibility
and the “best system” language and category-driven character of section 111.
149 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521–7554 “Motor Vehicle Emission and Fuel Standards.”
150 Council on Foreign Relations, The Global Climate Change Regime, http://www.cfr.org/
climate-change/global-climate-change-regime/p21831 (last visited July 15, 2012).
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E. Type 5 Flexibility: Sequestration
Even if EPA were to successfully argue that Type 3 and possibly Type 4
flexibility are part of the “best system,” this move still might not allow
credits generated by sequestration of GHGs—Type 5 flexibility—to be
incorporated into performance standards.
Sequestration, by definition, does not reduce emissions.151 Sequestration
offsets are generated when nonemitting entities (usually landowners) make
moves that reduce concentrations but not emissions of a pollutant.152
Landowners who plant trees or otherwise change land-use practices to
increase the potential for sequestration are potential sources of
sequestration offsets, which are specifically referred to as afforestation
offsets.153 Correspondingly, policies that allow the use of such offsets give
landowners the incentive to take such action.154 But these actions do not
reduce emissions. In fact, they increase emissions when emissions
restrictions are in place if emitting sources opt to purchase the resulting
offsets instead of cutting their own emissions. 155

151 See MELISSA CHAN & SARAH FORBES, NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., CARBON SEQUESTRATION
ROLE IN STATE AND LOCAL ACTIONS 2–3 (2005), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/
technologies/carbon_seq/refshelf/slfinal_1.pdf; OFFICE OF ATMOSPHERIC PROGRAMS, ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, NO. 430-R-05-006, GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION POTENTIAL IN U.S. FORESTRY AND
AGRICULTURE 2-1 to 2-2 (2005) available at http://www.epa.gov/sequestration/greenhouse
_gas.html.
152 See CHAN & FORBES, supra note 151; LIESE COULTER ET AL., GLOBAL CLIMATE PROJECT,
REPORT NO. 6, CARBON REDUCTIONS AND OFFSETS 6 (2007) available at http://www.
globalcarbonproject.org/global/pdf/ReportSeries/GCP_Report_No.6.pdf.
153 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Afforestation, http://www.rggi.org/market/offsets/
categories/afforestation (last visited July 15, 2012); see generally Tristram O. West, Gregg
Marland, A Synthesis of Carbon Sequestration, Carbon Emissions and Net Carbon Flux in
Agriculture: Comparing Tillage Practices in the United States, 91 AGRIC. ECOSYSTEMS & ENVTL.
217 (giving a broad overview of how agriculture and land use practices can be used to reduce
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration).
154 Amy L. Ross-Davis et al., Afforestation Motivations of Private Landowners: An
Examination of Hardwood Tree Plantings in Indiana, 22 N. J. APPLIED FORESTRY 149, 149–150
(2005) available at http://www.human-dimensions.org/storage/article-pdfs/3.pdf. This example
illustrates the effects of afforestation offsets. Offsets created by avoided deforestation—that is,
projects that prevent the destruction of forests (and the resulting emissions) that would have
otherwise occurred—are harder to classify. Avoiding deforestation does reduce emissions
because at least some portion of the carbon locked into the forest’s biomass would otherwise
be emitted when the trees burn or decompose. Georg Kindermann et al., Global Cost Estimates
of Reducing Carbon Emissions Through Avoided Deforestation, 30 Prc. Of the Nat’l Acad. Of
Sci. 10,302, 10,302 (2008). But it also has a sequestration component, to the extent that forests
that survive as a result of the avoided-deforestation project continue to sequester atmospheric
carbon. In other words, afforestation offsets are an example of Type 5 flexibility, but avoideddeforestation offsets are partly Type 4 and partly Type 5. The distinction is unlikely to matter,
however. First, the distinction matters only if one of the two types is legal under section 111 but
the other is not, and it appears that neither Type 4 nor Type 5 flexibility is legally permissible.
Second, even if Type 4 flexibility is permissible but Type 5 is not, EPA could simply characterize
avoided-deforestation offsets as Type 4 by avoiding the emissions/sequestration issue entirely.
155 Transnational Institute, Carbon Trading, http://www.tni.org/primer/carbon-trading (last
visited July 15, 2012). Note that this does not mean that sequestration offsets are ineffectual in
terms of their climate impacts. Instead, it means that they affect atmospheric carbon via a
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For purposes of CAA regulation, the distinction matters. Because
sequestration offsets do not reduce emissions, it is hard to see how they can
be considered part of the “best system of emission reduction.” The plain
language of section 111(a) appears to require actual, concrete emissions
reductions, not reductions in atmospheric concentrations. It is entirely
plausible that such an argument will be made by environmental groups in
litigation against any CAA program that includes forest offsets.156 The plain
language of the statute makes it relatively easy for judges to accept the
argument and find that EPA would exceed its discretion to permit offsetting
emissions through sequestration.157
This is an unfortunate limitation of section 111 and an illustration of the
fact that the section—along with much of the rest of the CAA—was designed
for control of pollution problems fundamentally different from GHGs.
Contrary to the toxic, local, or at most regional, pollution problems covered
by the CAA in the past,158 the globally mixed, stock pollutant nature of GHGs
makes worldwide ambient concentrations more important than current
emissions or short-term concentrations.159 The CAA is not incapable of
dealing with such a pollutant, but it has limitations—of which the apparent
inability to deal with sequestration is one example.
Offset proponents might argue that differentiating between
sequestration and emissions-reducing offsets is splitting hairs. The intent of
Congress in crafting section 111, they might argue, was to give EPA the tools
mechanism other than the direct reduction of anthropogenic emissions. The difference is
immaterial from a geophysical perspective but relevant from a legal one.
156 See, e.g., Press Release, Clean Air Task Force, Statement of Ann Brewster Weeks on EPA
Deferral of CO2 Emissions from Bioenergy and Other Biogenic Sources from Clean Air Act
Permitting Requirements (Mar. 19, 2011), available at http://www.catf.us/newsroom/
releases/2011/20110309-CATF_Statement_on_EPA_Biomass_announcement.pdf (claiming, in
reference to EPA decision to treat biomass emissions as carbon neutral for CAA permitting
purposes, that “there is nothing in the Clean Air Act that supports either a categorical offramp
from permitting or a categorical BACT [best available control technology] determination for
biomass fuels. Treating a ton of carbon pollution emissions generated by burning trees
differently than a ton of carbon pollution emissions generated by burning any other fuel, either
on a temporary basis or permanently, is just not justified in the law.”) Weeks is Senior Counsel
and attorney of record for the Conservation Law Foundation, one of a group of environmental
plaintiffs that sued the EPA in Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, No. 11-1101, (DC Cir. 2011)
regarding the agency’s 2011 decision to delay a decision on the treatment of biomass emissions
in the permitting process for three years (effectively treating biomass as carbon neutral during
that period).
157 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2006) (“The term ‘standard of performance’ means a
standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission limitation
achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into
account the cost of achieving such reduction and any nonair quality health and environmental
impact and energy requirements) the Administrator determines has been adequately
demonstrated”).
158 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, History of the Clean Air Act, http://epa.gov/air/caa/caa_
history.html (last visited July 15, 2012).
159 See id.; see U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS UNDER
THE CLEAN AIR ACT 5 (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/
anpr/ANPRPreamble.pdf (noting that the CAA is “ill-suited” for the task of regulating
greenhouse gases).
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to address threats to public health from emitting source categories, not to
rigidly focus on reducing smokestack emissions.160 Congress, they might
further argue, did not and could not have anticipated the intricacies of all
pollutants that might be regulated under the CAA and, in particular, the
peculiar characteristics of global (as opposed to local) pollution problems
like GHGs.
This argument contradicts the plain language of the statute.161 Congress
could have given EPA the authority to require or allow actions other than
emissions reduction to mitigate harms from air pollutants, but did not do so,
at least not in section 111. Even despite this conflict with the plain language
of the statute, a court might still be willing to liberally interpret the section
111(a) definition if it were not for the fact that many environmental groups
dispute the utility of offsets in countering climate change. These groups will
argue, with some justification, that smokestack emissions reductions are a
more effective and measurable policy tool for reducing the impact of GHGs
than are most forms of offsets.162 This, they might generalize, is the reason
for (or at least a reason for not deviating from) Congress’ focus on emissions
reductions—only such reductions can guarantee environmental benefits.
Both sides in this debate make good points, but only one has the statutory
text on its side.
Another counterargument is that carbon sequestration could be
considered a form of “negative emissions.” This makes sense from a certain
perspective because sources regulated under section 111 performance
standards that might buy credits generated by sequestration projects would
do so as a means to reduce their net emissions. Regulated facilities have
“positive emissions” from their operations, and Type 5 flexibility—
sequestration offsets—provide the negative counterpart. This is
conceptually valid but semantically ambitious, akin to a football announcer
commenting that a player pushed back from the line of scrimmage “gained
negative yardage”, or EPA suggesting that regulation does not have costs,
but rather, “negative benefits.” It is hard to predict how a court would view
this interpretation, but relying on it seems very risky.
Assuming one believes that offsets are a useful policy tool, a focus on
emissions over concentrations is a disadvantage for CAA performance
standards relative to NAAQS—a program that does focus on atmospheric
concentrations of the pollutants it regulates, and gives states broad latitude
to regulate with the aim of meeting concentration targets.163 But performance
160 Frank B. Cross, Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act: A New Approach to the Control of
Airborne Carcinogens, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 215, 231–234 (1986).
161 See 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006).
162 See, e.g., JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG RESEARCH SERV., RL 34241, VOLUNTARY CARBON
OFFSETS: OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT 2–15 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc

/RL34241.pdf (describing various integrity concerns with carbon offsets); Sylvester Johnson,

Politically Possible Tax for Reduction of Fossil Fuel Usage in the U.S. and Worldwide,
EARTHZINE, July 20, 2009, http://www.earthzine.org/2009/07/20/politically-possible-tax-forreduction-of-fossil-fuel-usage-in-the-us-and-worldwide/ (last visited July 15, 2012).
163 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a) (2006) (calling on EPA to determine air quality criteria for air
pollutants which “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare”); Id. at
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standards have many other practical advantages over NAAQS, and the
mainstream view held by EPA, industry, and most major environmental
groups appears to be that a NAAQS for GHGs is the wrong approach, both
politically and practically.164
If Type 5 flexibility—sequestration offsets—is incompatible with
section 111 performance standards, major sources of offsets—such as
afforestation of previously deforested land or other land-use changes, or
even future carbon-sequestering geoengineering projects—will be
unavailable. If this is correct, it implicitly forces CAA climate policy to
accept the forest status quo and to forgo any incentives to remedy future
deforestation. In practice, this would substantially reduce the volume of
offsets available.

F. Biomass—Another Option?
Although allowing power plants to burn biomass for electricity
generation is a flexibility mechanism, it does not readily fit into the
framework described in Part III.B. However, this option might be more
important than some of the analyzed types of flexibility. Legal analysis of the
scope for including such biomass co-firing within section 111 performance
standards is also quite similar in many ways to that for compliance flexibility
with other sources described in the preceding sections. Briefly discussing
biomass therefore is not only useful in its own right, but sheds additional
light on interpretation of section 111.
Biomass co-firing has been cited by EPA as a plausible short-term
emissions-reducing option,165 and its cost savings appear to be substantial.166
Biomass is also controversial, however, with critics claiming that it would do
little if anything to reduce net emissions.167 Notwithstanding
§ 7410 (listing the specific requirements that states must adhere to so as to be in compliance
with NAAQs); see supra Part IV.A.3 (discussing flexibility for states regarding NAAQS).
164 See Nathan Richardson, Greenhouse Gas Regulation under the Clean Air Act: Does
Chevron Set the EPA Free?, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 296–99 (2010); see also Richardson et al.,

Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: Structure, Effects, and Implications of a
Knowable Pathway, supra note 30, at 10,102–03.
165 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA DOCKET NO. OAR-2008-4444, Technical SUPPORT
DOCUMENT FOR THE ADVANCED NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING FOR GREENHOUSE GASES;
STATIONARY SOURCES, SECTION VII 17 (2008) (“In addition to heat rate improvements, biomass
co-firing can substitute for some of the coal in most types of existing and future coal-fired
boilers, resulting in proportionately lower GHG emissions . . . . As a pragmatic order-ofmagnitude estimate, biomass co-firing might eventually substitute for 2 percent to 5 percent of
coal used in the current coal fleet.”).
166 See BURTRAW ET AL., supra note 7, at 14–16.
167 See, e.g., Press Release, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Lawsuit Challenges Clean Air Act
Exemption for Biomass Burners (Aug 15, 2011), http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/
press_releases/2011/biomass-08-15-2011.html (last visited July 1, 2012) (“Recent scientific
information indicates that burning biomass—trees, for example—can actually increase global
warming pollution, even compared to fossil fuels. According to scientists, nearly all biomass
fuels cause at least temporary near-term increases in atmospheric CO2 concentrations,
significant amounts of which will persist in the atmosphere and cause climate damage for a
century or more. This near-term increase directly undermines efforts to reduce carbon dioxide
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this controversy, can EPA legally treat biomass as an emissions
reduction strategy?
It is important, first, to draw a distinction between facilities that
exclusively burn biomass, and biomass co-firing at fossil fuel power plants.
No legal barrier prevents EPA from setting separate section 111
performance standards for dedicated biomass facilities; these could be
regulated under their own source category, distinct from fossil fuel plants.168
Biomass facilities do have significant smokestack GHG emissions,169 but
there is no apparent reason why EPA cannot consider the net lifecycle
emissions of biomass if it so chooses.170 EPA need not treat emissions of a
pollutant from different source categories equally. The agency, for example,
is required to consider costs independently for each category.171 This does
not, of course, mean that EPA decisions on stringency for biomass-only
facilities are easy. As noted, the lifecycle emissions of biomass are a subject
of controversy.172 But that is a technical and policy problem, not a legal one.
The scope for allowing differential treatment of biomass co-firing under
section 111 performance standards is more complex, however. Like the
types of flexibility discussed above, biomass co-firing does not reduce
emissions at the regulated facility; rather, it probably would increase
emissions because biomass fuels are generally less efficient than fossil fuels
(i.e., more must be burned to achieve the same energy output, resulting in
greater GHG emissions).173 Regrowth would then result in resequestration of
at least some of these carbon emissions, although how much is the subject
of controversy.174
But, just as with Type 5 flexibility, this resequestration is indirect and
affects atmospheric carbon concentrations, not smokestack emissions.175 As
discussed above with reference to offsets,176 section 111 explicitly targets
emissions reductions from facilities in regulated source categories, in
contrast to other sections of the CAA such as the section 110 NAAQS that
emissions over the next several years, an effort that is essential to avoid the very worst damage
due to climate change.”).
168 See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b) (2006).
169 See, e.g., STOCKHOLM ENV’T INST., GREENHOUSE GAS AND AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS OF
ALTERNATIVES FOR WOODY BIOMASS RESIDUES 32–36 (2010), available at http://data.orcaa.
org/index.php/download_file/view/150/168/ (examining the emissions data from various uses of
woody biomass).
170 See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A), (f)(2)(A)–(C) (2006).
171 See id. § 7411(h)(2)(B).
172 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, supra note 167.
173 See OR. DEP’T OF FORESTRY, ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF FOREST BIOMASS REMOVAL 46
(2008), available at http://www.oregon.gov/ENERGY/RENEW/Biomass/docs/ODF_Biomass
_Removal_Effects.pdf (noting also that forest biomass could be “CO2 neutral” due to new
plant growth).
174 Id.; see also Eric Mortenson, Using Oregon’s Forests for Bioenergy Production has a
Down Side: Increased Carbon Emissions, THE OREGONIAN, Oct. 23, 2011, http://www.oregonlive.
com/environment/index.ssf/2011/10/using_oregons_forests_for_bioe.html (last visited July 15,
2012) (describing controversy over carbon neutrality of woody biomass).
175 OR. DEP’T OF FORESTRY, supra note 173, at 46–47 (describing carbon cycle but also noting
carbon emissions from biomass processing, transportation, and production).
176 See supra Part III.B.
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target concentrations of pollutants in the atmosphere.177 Momentarily setting
aside the lack of certainty over lifecycle carbon effects, characterizing
biomass co-firing as emissions reduction is at worst simply incompatible
with the language of section 111, and at best requires an ambitious
redefinition of the term “emissions.” As noted above, opponents of biomass
combustion, as part of carbon policy, have taken legal positions along these
lines in response to other EPA biomass regulation.178
It is possible, however, that EPA might be able to avoid some of the
problems associated with differential treatment of biomass co-firing by using
its powers to define source categories, just as it may be able to do for Type 2
flexibility.179 For example, EPA could create new source categories for
power plants that use biomass for a given percentage of their fuel inputs,
then issue performance standards for those categories that, as discussed
above for biomass-only source categories, treat emissions more favorably
than those from purely fossil power plants.180 This move allows the agency to
convert co-firing, analogous to Type 5 flexibility, into Type 2 flexibility.
Although promising, a similar move is not available for other sources of
Type 5 flexibility because they are not emitters and cannot be placed into a
source category.
Although somewhat inelegant, such categorization would allow the
agency to avoid the strongest arguments in a challenge to rules that treat
biomass emissions differently—though at the cost of additional
administratively complex rulemakings. EPA has so far shown no evidence
that it intends to subdivide the fossil electricity source category for which it
will soon propose performance standards. Until and unless it does so, it may
be legally impossible for the agency to credit biomass co-firing.181 Fine
subcategorization, whether to shoehorn differential crediting of biomass cofiring or for other reasons, may also decrease the cost-effectiveness of
regulation, undercutting the rationale for flexibility.182
In short, differential treatment of biomass emissions under section 111
regulation may prove problematic for EPA. Although the agency appears
free to treat emissions from biomass-only facilities as it wishes, favorable
treatment for biomass co-firing at fossil-fuel Electric Generating Units
(EGUs) may be legally difficult because it does not result in smokestack
emissions reductions. EPA’s categorization powers may provide

177
178
179

See supra Part IV.A.3. (discussing the difference between sections 110 and 111).
See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b) (2006) (directing EPA to, inter alia, publish “list[s] of categories of

stationary sources” and authorizing the agency to “distinguish among classes, types, and sizes
within categories”).
180 See id.
(directing EPA to establish performance standards for sources in such
categories). As noted for Type 2 flexibility generally, this would probably complicate the design
of a trading system. See supra Part IV.B.
181 Franz T. Litz & Nicholas M. Biancho, What to Expect from EPA: Regulation of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10480,
10482 (2010) (noting that emissions trading between categories of sources may not be allowed
under section 111).
182 BURTRAW ET AL., supra note 7, at 18.
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a workaround, although stretched agency resources might make the
option unattractive.
Though seemingly a small issue, biomass co-firing has additional
importance because many analyses of potential EPA carbon regulation have
assumed that it would be an available tool,183 and have predicted substantial
associated cost savings.184 If it is not available, estimates of the emissions
reductions available to EPA will have to be revised down,
perhaps significantly.
Type of

Compatible
Arguments for:

Arguments against:

•Part of “best system of

•“Best system” refers to level of

flexibility:
Type 1:
same source
category

with §111?

emission reduction”
•State

powers

through

§110

analogy

§111(d);

Probably

stringency, not design of standards

(existing sources only)

•Section 111 design’s technology focus
is incompatible with trading §110
defines
•§111(d) is procedure, not substance

Type 2:

•Agency ability to redefine

other regulated

source categories makes

categories

Probably

•Paper standards do not save time and

Probably not

Type 2 equivalent to Type 1

Type 3:

•Agency could issue “paper”

unregulated

standards, converting into

categories

•No precedent for “supercategories”

Type 2
•ERCs under §110 give
parallel support

are likely to result in litigation
•§110 ERCs create negative inference
•Arguably incompatible with source
category-based design of §111

•Part of “best system”
Type 4:
extra–CAA
sources

•Extra–CAA sources not
subject to regulation, just
sources of credits, so
limitations of statute’s
reach not important

•No indication that §111 is

Probably not

extraterritorial
•Sources outside §111 definition create
further incompatibility with source
category design
•No EPA international authority to
monitor or enforce

Type 5:
sequestration

•Sequestration is “negative
emissions”

offsets
Biomass
co-firing

•Sequestration does not reduce

Probably not

emissions, so cannot be part of “best
system of emission reduction”

•Agency can create narrow
source categories for

•Biomass does not reduce emissions, so

Probably

cannot be part of “best system”

varying levels of co-firing

Table 1. Key Arguments and Counterarguments for Flexibility under §111
183 See, e.g., id. at 14; Richardson et al., Greenhouse Gas Regulations Under the Clean Air
Act: Structure, Effects, and Implications of a Knowable Pathway, supra note 30, at 10,112 .
184 See FED. ENERGY MGMT. PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, FEDERAL TECHNOLOGY ALERT:
BIOMASS CO-FIRING IN COAL-FIRED BOILERS 3, available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy04osti/
33811.pdf; see also BURTRAW ET AL., supra note 7, at 21–22 (discussing the potential collective

cost savings from introducing general flexibility in CO2 emissions reduction activities).
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G. Summary
The arguments presented for and against each type of flexibility, and
for biomass co-firing, are admittedly complex. Table 1 above collects the
most important arguments for easier consideration.
V. THE ROLE OF STATES
The previous Parts of this Article discussed possible legal limitations to
the compliance flexibility available to EPA under section 111 for the sake of
regulating GHGs. But the ESPS under section 111(d)—probably the most
important and wide-reaching part of GHG regulations under the CAA—is
federalist at heart: the states, not EPA, play the largest role.185 It is therefore
important to look at what effect these legal limitations will have on states—
both on their implementation of section 111(d) performance standards, and
on their independent climate policies. Although states have great freedom to
implement climate policies in principle, this section illustrates how that
freedom is restricted in practice if CAA section 111 performance standards
are imposed, particularly if those standards exclude the extended flexibility
mechanisms discussed above.
Comparing federal and state climate policies is necessarily an apples-tooranges comparison. Although the above discussion of federal policy
focuses on the limitations presented by the CAA, the following discussion
treats states as free actors, legally bound only by the Constitution.186 This
ignores the fact that state policy depends on state legislative action, just as
the limits of federal policy would change if Congress amended the CAA or
passed new climate legislation.
Despite this contradiction, there are some good reasons for treating
states this way. First and most obviously, some states have more political
flexibility or willingness to act on climate change than Congress currently
does, as a matter of political reality.187 Moreover, some state legislatures
already have acted to create state-level climate policy, most notably
California in the form of its Assembly Bill (A.B.) 32 law.188 Finally, and more
practically, analyzing the limits of state environmental regulators’ ability to

185 DALLAS BURTRAW, ARTHUR G. FRAAS & NATHAN RICHARDSON, RES. FOR THE FUTURE,
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. RFF DP 12-05, TRADABLE STANDARDS FOR CLEAN AIR ACT CARBON
POLICY 3–4 (2012,), available at http://www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.
aspx?PublicationID=21738.
186 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
187 See e.g., H. Joseph Drapalski III, Note, The Viability of Interstate Collaboration in the
Absence of Federal Climate Change Legislation, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F., 469 (2011); see
also Wendy Koch, States take Lead in Efforts to Fight Climate Change, USA TODAY, Jan. 23,
2011, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/greenhouse/post/2011/01/states-tackle-globalwarming-cut-greenhouse-gas-emissions/1 (last visited July 15, 2012) (discussing some of the
state and regional initiatives to fill the void left by Congressional inaction on climate
change policy).
188 California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–
38599 (West, 2012).
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enact climate policies would require a detailed analysis of each state’s
environmental statutes and would be beyond the scope of this Article.

A. Environmental Federalism and States’ Freedom To Act
States are generally able to enact their own climate policies, including
emissions-trading or tax policies.189 Indeed many states already have done so.
Nine states have joined together in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI), an interstate trading program for GHG emissions from the
electricity sector.190 California has enacted a comprehensive GHG regulatory
policy under A.B. 32 that will include a cap-and-trade system.191 California is
also part of the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), which until recently
included other U.S. states and Canadian provinces. However, though no
other WCI member-state has been as aggressive as California.192

B. Constitutional Issues with State Programs
Some have raised constitutional concerns about these policies.193 One
argument is that they violate the Dormant Commerce Clause by
discriminating against out-of-state businesses (such as coal EGUs).194
Reports in late 2010 claimed that some states outside of RGGI and WCI

189 See DALLAS BURTRAW & BILL SHOBE, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, DISCUSSION PAPER NO. RFF
DP 09-54, STATE AND LOCAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY UNDER A NATIONAL EMISSIONS FLOOR 4–5,
7, 14 (2009), available at http://www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?
PublicationID=21605 (discussing the various climate change policies adopted by states and
local governments, including the possibility of taxing and cap and trade programs).
190 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Mission Statement, http://www.rggi.org/rggi (last
visited July 15, 2012) (listing state participants, including Connecticut, Delaware, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont).
191 See CAL. AIR RES. BD. (CARB), CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING PLAN: A FRAMEWORK
FOR CHANGE 30 (2008), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/
scopingplandocument.htm.
192 See Margot Roosevelt, California, New Mexico and 3 Canadian Provinces Outline
Regional Cap-and-Trade Program, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 2010, http://articles.
latimes.com/2010/jul/28/local/la-me-climate-pact-20100728 (last visited July 15, 2012); see
generally Western Climate Initiative, Design for the WCI Regional Program (2010),
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/the-wci-cap-and-trade-program/program-design
(last
visited July 15, 2012) (providing links to documents and reports about the WCI cap-andtrade program).
193 See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, AB 32, RGGI, and Climate Change: The National Context of
State Policies for a Global Commons Problem, AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF THE ENV’T, Oct. 1, 2010,
http://www.robertstavinsblog.org/2010/10/01/ab-32-rggi-and-climate-change-the-national-context
-of-state-policies for-a-global-commons-problem/ (last visited July 15, 2012) (predicting these
policies may face constitutional challenges arising from issues of federal preemption and the
dormant commerce clause).
194 See, e.g., id. (“In brief, in the absence of meaningful Federal action, sub-national climate
policies could well become the core of national action. Problems will no doubt arise, including
legal obstacles such as possible Federal preemption or litigation associated with the so-called
Dormant Commerce Clause.”).
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would file suits against California on Dormant Commerce Clause grounds.195
In December 2011, a District Court judge granted summary judgment to a
group of farming and oil-industry plaintiffs who sued to enjoin
implementation of the law’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS).196 The
decision was appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and the injunction was stayed on
April 23, 2012, allowing the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to
continue enforcing the LCFS, pending the outcome of the appeal.197
Another argument is that RGGI and other interstate GHG policies
violate the Compact Clause,198 which forbids states to enter into an
“Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power”
without congressional consent.199 Congress has given no specific consent for
RGGI or WCI and, the argument goes, these are “compacts” of the type
forbidden by the Constitution. Such a challenge does not appear to have
been made against either group to date, however, and some scholars have
concluded that such a challenge would be likely to fail.200 However, the
Compact Clause may nevertheless create problems if states attempt to
include international offsets in their programs or link with trading markets
in other countries (as California plans to do with its Canadian WCI
partners).201 These constitutional issues remain unresolved, but are largely
outside the scope of this Article.
Although these constitutional issues remain unresolved, neither of them
appear likely to derail state-level climate policies generally.202 But that
does not necessarily resolve the narrower questions of whether and how

195 See Mark Schapiro, Four States Prepare Legal Assault on California’s Climate Law,
CALIFORNIA WATCH, Sep. 10, 2009, http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/four-states-preparelegal-assault-californias-climate-law-4564 (last visited July 15, 2012) (stating that “[t]he attorneys
general of Alabama, Nebraska, Texas and North Dakota have been devising a legal strategy to
challenge the California act, signed by Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger in 2006, on the grounds that
it interferes with the right to freely conduct interstate commerce”).
196 Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Goldstene, CV-F-09-2234 LJO GSA, 2011 WL 6934759 (E.D.
Cal. 2011).
197 Order Staying Injunction Pending Appeal, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene
(9th Cir. 2012), No. 12-15131.
198 See Endangered Environmental Laws, Recent Cases: Indeck Corinth v. Paterson, http://
www.endangeredlaws.org/case_RGGI.htm (last visited July 15, 2012).
199 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
200 See, e.g., Michael S. Smith, Murky Precedent Meets Hazy Air: The Compact Clause and
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 34 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L. REV. 387, 415 (2007) (“In its
current iteration, it is likely that RGGI will not require congressional consent”); see also Daniel
A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 908 (2008)
(“Thus, although the states may be limited in their ability to form multi-state regulatory
authorities without congressional approval, policy coordination between states does not seem
to pose the same kind of challenge to national authority. Thus, if a number of states coordinate
on the adoption of similar climate change regulations and allow trading between their emission
sources, the Compact Clause should not be implicated, provided that regulatory authority and
enforcement powers continue to be held by the states themselves rather than by some
interstate agency. For this reason, the RGGI trading system between the Northeast states does
not appear to pose a problem under the Compact Clause.”).
201 See Roosevelt, supra note 192.
202 See, e.g., Endangered Environmental Laws, supra note 198; Farber, supra note 200.
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such policies might include offsets or the other flexibility mechanisms
discussed above.

C. Leakage
If EPA adopts even a basic form of compliance flexibility for section
111 GHG performance standards—such as Type 1—this would raise
concerns about GHG emission “leakage” in states that have more aggressive
standards.203 Because the stricter state programs do not result in increased
stringency of the national program, those state programs may not reduce
emissions, but rather simply export them to other states. Emitters that
comply with strict state programs will over-comply with the federal
standards, and therefore will have allowances or credits that can be traded
to out-of-state emitters. The buyers of these credits can then emit the same
amount of GHGs that the state sought to eliminate. Because GHGs are global
pollutants, the state policy would see no environmental benefit.
Can this problem be avoided? Maybe. It helps that states control the
implementation of section 111(d) standards.204 A state with a more stringent
program could opt out of any flexibility component of those standards
suggested by EPA, or at least out of any interstate trading.205 It might also be
able to design its section 111(d) program so as to allow only emissions
reductions beyond those required by both federal and state regulation to
generate tradable credits. Other technical fixes are undoubtedly available.

D. Extended Flexibility at the State Level
Because state legislatures and state environmental regulators control
the design of state-level climate polices, those policies can include almost
any particular tool. A state could enact a cap-and-trade system (as California
and RGGI have),206 a renewable portfolio standard (as many states have
done), a carbon tax, or other mechanisms.
This includes many types of extended flexibility as well. Nothing
prevents California from, for example, allowing land-use change of some
type to generate offsets for use in the A.B. 32 cap-and-trade program.
Assuming that interstate trading programs like RGGI are generally legal,207
203 See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354,
44,413–14 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1) (noting concerns that GHG
regulation could be undercut by leakage at both an international and national level); see also
William A. Pizer, Issue Brief 4: Scope and Point of Regulation for Pricing Policies to Reduce
Fossil-Fuel CO2 Emissions, in ASSESSING U.S. CLIMATE POLICY OPTIONS: A REPORT SUMMARIZING
WORK AT RFF AS PART OF THE INTER-INDUSTRY U.S. CLIMATE POLICY FORUM 77 (Raymond J. Kopp
& William A. Pizer, eds., 2007) (discussing leakage concerns associated with California’s
regulatory program).
204 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(c) (2006).
205 See WANNIER ET AL., supra note 8, at 3, 8, 10, 14.
206 See supra notes 189–192 and accompanying text.
207 See supra Part V.B (discussing possible constitutional issues with state GHG interstate
trading programs).
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offsets from other participating states could similarly be included. From the
perspective of each regulating state, this is a form of Type 4 flexibility
because the out-of-state sources are outside the reach of
state regulators.
Legal problems with extended flexibility may arise in two scenarios.
First, international offsets may present constitutional problems that could
limit or prevent their adoption. Second, the limitations on extended
flexibility under the CAA discussed above could cause compatibility issues
with state-level programs, perhaps even causing states not to include them.
This particular constitutional issue has been analyzed elsewhere,208 so this
Part will only discuss the second legal problem: state and federal
CAA compatibility.
Even if states face no constitutional restrictions on their ability to
incorporate extended flexibility, they could, ironically, be discouraged from
doing so by the presence of the parallel EPA program. If EPA cannot include
certain types of flexibility in its program, or simply chooses not to, it may
become incompatible with state programs that do include those types. If
emitters in, say, California, use international avoided-deforestation offset
purchases (Type 4 flexibility) to comply with emissions cuts required by the
state, they would be out of compliance with a federal standard that required
emission cuts at the facility or source category (Type 1) level. This would be
true even if state requirements were more strict than federal requirements in
terms of emissions. In this scenario, credits obtained through types of
flexibility excluded under federal regulation would be useful only for the
additional emissions reductions states impose beyond EPA requirements.
This increases the cost of state programs without any emissions benefit.
This simple scenario hides much legal complexity. ESPS regulation
under section 111(d) is primarily a state activity.209 EPA simply sets initial
guidelines and reviews state plans, intervening only if states fail to act.210 But
states do not have complete discretion in writing their section 111(d) plans.
As discussed above, states must set standards of performance within the
definition of the CAA, which limits their ability to incorporate extended
flexibility just as it does for EPA.211 Section 111(d) does not limit states’
ability to regulate emissions more stringently, but neither does it grant states
the ability to use tools other than “standards of performance” for the
emissions cuts or efficiency improvements required under the CAA. This is
in contrast to NAAQS, which does grant state plans such broad flexibility so
long as environmental targets are met.212
It is possible that EPA could take more creative approaches to section
111(d) regulation, such as setting state-level budgets rather than facility-level

208 See MORRIS ET AL., supra note 143, at 12; see also Molly K. Macauley & Nathan
Richardson, Seeing the Forests and the Trees: Technological and Regulatory Impediments for
Global Carbon Monitoring, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1387, 1402–04 (2011).
209 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
210 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2006).
211 See supra Part IV.A.3.
212 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2) (2006).

TOJCI.RICHARDSON.DOC

776

8/3/2012 9:28 PM

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 42:735

targets. But even if doing so is permissible under section 111, it is unclear
whether such approaches would permit any of the types of flexibility (3, 4,
or 5) that may not be compatible with section 111.
EPA’s position on compatibility between its planned section 111(d)
standards and state-level climate programs is unclear. One senior figure at
the agency has indicated that EPA will seek compatibility, stating that
“[t]here is a very live possibility in upcoming guidelines and state
implementation of those guidelines [that section 111(d) standards] would be
compatible with existing state programs.”213 But others at EPA have
expressed skepticism over whether compatibility is possible, particularly
with state programs that include trading and offsets.214 EPA officials have
also stated that they do not intend to implement cap-and-trade via section
111.215 Although it is unclear exactly what regulatory approaches EPA would
include and exclude, linking section 111(d) regulation to state programs that
explicitly use cap-and-trade might violate EPA’s intention for section 111.216
It is important to stress that none of these potential incompatibilities
limits states’ freedom to develop their own climate policies, including the
freedom to determine what level of flexibility is available and whether
extended flexibility is included.217 But compliance with section 111(d) is not
optional, and states are bound by its limitations.218 For categories of sources
regulated under CAA performance standards, states therefore face a choice:
impose dual, overlapping requirements, or tailor their programs to comply
with the limits of section 111(d)—at least for that portion of emissions
reduction required by the federal guidelines.
If states with their own climate programs are unable to use extended
flexibility for compliance with section 111(d) EPA regulation, these states’
program choices will narrow, and other states may be less likely to join
existing interstate climate agreements. States with existing programs will
probably be less likely to include offsets in their programs because they
would be useful only for emissions restrictions beyond federal requirements.
The administrative, enforcement, and compliance costs of an offset program
might not be justifiable under these conditions, leading states to abandon
213 Dawn Reeves, EPA Hints At Granting State GHG Programs “Equivalency” under NSPS,
INSIDE EPA, Apr. 7, 2011, http://insideepa.com/201104072360309/EPA-Daily-News/DailyNews/epa-hints-at-granting-state-ghg-programs-equivalency-under-nsps/menu-id-95.html
(quoting EPA senior air counsel Joe Goffman).
214 Id. (“EPA air chief Gina McCarthy at the listening sessions has openly grappled with how
the agency could incorporate flexibilities offered under the state programs, such as allowance
purchases and offsets, into the federal rule.”).
215 Id. (“McCarthy has also been adamant that EPA would not seek to establish a broad capand-trade program under the NSPS rules, particularly given the current political climate against
a carbon cap on Capitol Hill.”).
216 Section 111’s existing source performance standards are technology requirements
designed to apply to a facility regardless of a GHG trading scheme. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7411(d) (2006).
217 See WANNIER ET AL., supra note 8, at 10–11.
218 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (providing that “each State shall submit to the
Administrator a plan which (A) establishes standards of performance . . . and (B) provides for
the implementation and enforcement of such standards of performance”).
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offsets entirely.219 As a result, costs would increase (assuming offsets are the
cheapest option available to emitters for meeting state requirements). This
has obvious effects on the regulating states, but also makes other states less
likely to join interstate programs. Federal climate regulation might also
rob efforts to implement climate policy at the state level of much of
their momentum.220
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

A. Legal Limits, Political Pressure, and EPA
At least in the short term, EPA action under the CAA appears to be the
only game in town for federal climate policy. In practice, this means an old
statute will be used for a new, possibly uniquely challenging policy problem.
This is not a disaster. Evidence suggests that, given smart choices, EPA can
implement a fairly effective and cost-effective set of short- to medium-term
policies. There are limitations, however. Cost-effective climate policy almost
certainly involves an economy-wide carbon price and incorporates offsets—
in particular, those generated by forest management in tropical countries.221
The CAA pathway appears incompatible with both.
The inclusion of extended flexibility, including some forms of offsets, in
the most important part of the EPA/CAA climate program—section 111
performance standards—cannot be ruled out. But including them requires
ambitious interpretation of statutory language, and even that is not enough
to allow the use of the most attractive categories of offsets: forests.
Although EPA may be able to implement carbon-cutting policies that
politically the current Congress cannot,222 the agency is legally constrained
by the scope of authority granted by earlier Congresses as embodied in the
CAA. In other words, EPA’s powers are limited. In congressional discussions
of climate bills, politics made it necessary to deviate from blackboard ideals
of cost-effective policies.223 The CAA will require EPA to deviate from those
idealized policies too.

219 See, e.g., Richardson et al., supra note 30, at 10102–03 (2011) (describing the complexities
inherent in regulating GHGs through the CAA NAAQS program).
220 Conceivably, section 111(d) could also promote stronger climate policies in those states
that do not already have them because it will force all states to have the administrative
structure of a climate policy in place, reducing start-up costs for the program.
221 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COST-EFFECTIVE ACTIONS TO TACKLE CLIMATE
CHANGE 4 (2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/40/43656443.pdf (discussing the
cost-effectiveness of various carbon emission mitigation policies); BRIAN C. MURRAY ET AL.,
NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POLICY SOLUTIONS, INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL FOREST CARBON
INCENTIVES IN CLIMATE POLICY: UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMICS 10–11 (2009), available at
http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/institute/carbon.economy.06.09.pdf.
222 WORLD RES. INST., U.S. CLIMATE ACTION IN 2009–2010, at 1 (2010), available at http://pdf.
wri.org/factsheets/factsheet_us_climate_action_in_2009-2010.pdf.
223 See, e.g., U.S. Congressman Pete Stark, Statement of Congressman Peter Stark Opposing
Watered-Down Global Warming Legislation, http://www.stark.house.gov/index.php?option=com
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Even if they are not legally conclusive, the strength of arguments
against Types 3, 4, and 5 flexibility makes it much less likely that EPA will
take the practical risk of including offsets. Though the agency has made
some bold interpretive moves in the recent past—most notably in CAMR—
courts have not generally been receptive.224 The agency may therefore have
lost some of its appetite for ambitious interpretation of the CAA, particularly
in the context of its already controversial GHG regulatory programs.225
Moreover, institutional politics may constrain the agency in practice as
much as or more than the CAA itself does. Many in Congress, particularly
but not exclusively Republicans, are strongly opposed to the agency’s GHG
regulatory programs, and have sought legislation delaying or removing EPA
authority over GHGs.226 They have also sought to cut agency funding.227 In
this environment, EPA is much less likely to be bold than it would be in
quieter times or for less headline-grabbing pollutants, particularly with
respect to tools like offsets that do not have strong support from
many environmentalists.
For offsets, reduced EPA funding has direct implications. Offset
programs are likely to be administratively complex and labor intensive for
the agency, especially relative to more traditional performance standard
approaches under section 111.228 Although some of this workload could be
shifted to states under section 111(d), much of it could not—especially
insofar as international offsets are concerned.229 Budgetary situations in the
states are hardly more favorable.230
_content&view=article&id=1299:statement-opposing-watered-down-global-warminglegislation&catid=54:press-releases-2009&Itemid=100011 (last visited July 1, 2012).
224 See N.J. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 517 F.3d 574, 583–84 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (rejecting EPA’s
CAMR mercury cap-and-trade program); see also N.C. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 531 F.3d 896,
909–10, 929–30 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (vacating and remanding EPA’s Clean Air
Interstate Rule limiting sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions).
225 See, e.g., Ryan Tracy, House Votes to Stop EPA from Regulating Greenhouse Gases, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 7, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487041016045762493711744576
68.html (last visited July 15, 2012) (discussing Republican attempts, with limited support from a
few Democratic members, to legislatively curb EPA’s authority under the Clean Air Act to
combat GHG production); Lynne Peeples, TRAIN Act to Limit Clean Air Protection Passes the
House, HUFFINGTON POST, Sep. 23, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/23/train-actclean-air-protection-house_n_978502.html (last visited July 15, 2012); David Rogers, EPA
Funding Cuts Outlined by COP POLITICO, July 6, 2011, http://www.politico.com/news/
stories/0711/58409.html (last visited July 1, 2012).
226 See Peeples, supra note 225.
227 See Rogers, supra note 225.
228 For an example of the potential complexity of an offset program and the multitude of
factors involved, see RENÉE JOHNSON ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41086, POTENTIAL
IMPLICATIONS OF A CARBON OFFSET PROGRAM TO FARMERS AND LANDOWNERS 4–8 (2010), available
at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/R41086.pdf; Peter Erickson, Michael Lazarus
& Alexia Kelly, The Role of Domestic Offsets in U.S. Climate Policy and the Importance of
Program Design 7, available at http://www.lindentrust.org/pdfs/SEI_WRI_InternalReview_Offset
_Supply.pdf.
229 See supra Part IV.D.1.
230 See, e.g., ELIZABETH MCNICHOL, PHIL OLIFF & NICHOLAS JOHNSON, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES, STATES CONTINUE TO FEEL RECESSION’S IMPACT 2–3 (2012) (noting that budget deficits
for most states are so large that “even if revenues continue to grow at last year’s rate [of 8.3% at
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Put differently, it is not clear that offsets have a constituency pressing
EPA to include them, so why would EPA expend its limited political capital
and agency resources to implement them, given the apparent legal barriers
and administrative costs?
The role of political pressure in the design of EPA’s GHG programs is
somewhat ironic; offsets and emissions trading are cost-control and
efficiency mechanisms.231 Without them, EPA regulation is likely to be more
costly,232 less environmentally valuable,233 or both. Although it grabs
headlines to accuse EPA of attempting to implement cap -and-trade through
the back door, such attacks make trading less likely, not caps.234 The same
may be true for offsets.

B. Flexibility and Stringency
If extended flexibility options like offsets are not available, the
implications affect not only the costs of EPA-driven climate policy, but also
the level of stringency—that is, the level of environmental benefits—that the
agency can legally and politically justify. The issues of stringency and
flexibility are linked. The more stringent EPA’s CAA climate policy, the more
important extended flexibility becomes. If CAA regulation requires only
minimal reductions in GHG emissions, many sources will be able to meet the
standards at reasonable cost either alone or via Type 1 flexibility (trading
with sources in the same category). Evidence suggests that significant
opportunities for improving efficiency are available at coal plants,
for example.235
It is possible that these and other relatively easily identifiable and lowcost opportunities for domestic emissions reduction could be targeted by
the end of the fiscal 2011 year]—which is highly unlikely . . . it would take seven years to get
[the states] back on a normal track”).
231 See supra Part III.A.
232 Kevin Doran & Alaine Ginnochio, United States Climate Policy: Using Market-Based
Strategies to Achieve Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 31,
71, 79 (2008) (noting that “[t]he primary benefit of emission offsets is that they help lower the
cost of reducing emissions” and that “[e]ven if the efficiencies of an emissions tax outweigh the
benefits of a cap-and-trade system, a cap-and-trade system may be the best choice and may
represent the cost of prior inaction”).
233 Id. at 33, 38 (arguing, in part, that it is necessary to set a price on carbon—either through
a cap-and-trade scheme or through a tax on emissions—in order to keep “global temperature
changes within an acceptable range”).
234 See, e.g., Phil Kerpen, Chris Christie Strikes a Major Blow Against Cap-and-Trade, FOX
NEWS.COM, May 26, 2011, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/05/26/chris-christie-strikesmajor-blow-cap-trade/ (last visited July 14, 2012) (hailing the New Jersey governor for
withdrawing from a multi-state compact to implement a cap-and-trade system in the American
northeast, deriding cap-and-trade programs in general, and suggesting that President Obama
will rely on the EPA to engage in “back door regulatory attacks on affordable energy and
American jobs”).
235 See BURTRAW ET AL., supra note 29, at 299–301; BURTRAW ET AL., supra note 7, at 7–8; see
also generally SARGENT & LUNDY, LLC, COAL-FIRED POWER PLANT HEAT RATE REDUCTIONS, FINAL
REPORT (2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/resource/docs/coalfired.pdf (studying
various methods of reducing required fuel energy input for coal-fired power plants).
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performance standards. But if these opportunities are not available, or if
EPA fails to identify them, then the costs of climate policy will increase or
ambitions for GHG reductions will have to be moderate. The more stringent
EPA’s emissions reduction goals become, and the longer the CAA remains
the only federal climate policy, the more quickly these opportunities will be
exhausted. In the meantime, other countries may adopt policies that
incorporate offsets.236 It is possible that by the time the United States adopts
a climate policy not grounded in a 1970s statute, other countries may have
already taken advantage of the most cost-effective carbon-reducing
opportunities.237
The relationship between stringency and flexibility goes in both
directions. Because EPA must take cost into consideration when setting
performance standards under section 111,238 and because higher-cost
regulation will likely increase political pressure on the agency, the
environmental goals reachable under section 111 are constrained. If
extended flexibility is unavailable, then standards cannot be as stringent.
Although the agency’s ability to consider costs is generally a good thing, in
this case it combines with section 111’s apparent limitations on available
tools to undermine EPA’s ability to achieve meaningful emissions reductions
under the CAA.
Not everyone agrees that this tradeoff exists.239 The analysis in this
Article has generally assumed that the effect of extended flexibility tools like
offsets on carbon concentrations is equivalent to the smokestack emissions
cuts they replace. But some view the environmental gains of offsets and
other options such as biomass co-firing as illusory.240 These observers may
cheer rather than lament a policy pathway in which these tools are difficult

236
237

See BURTRAW ET AL., supra note 29, at 305.

On the other hand, it might be better to wait. In principle, technological change could
make carbon-reducing opportunities cheaper, not more expensive, over time. Even if other
countries were to, for example, take advantage of the most cost-effective forest offsets, future
energy technologies might make all offsets less attractive, or sequestration geoengineering
could even become available at low cost. ROBERT N. STAVINS & KENNETH R. RICHARDS, THE COST
OF U.S. FOREST-BASED CARBON SEQUESTRATION 8 (2005), available at http://www.c2es.org/
docUploads/Sequest_Final.pdf (“In the give-and-take of policy debates, the abatement costs of
proposed regulations have sometimes been over-estimated. This . . . is also a natural
consequence of employing short-term cost analyses that do not take into account the potential
for future cost savings due to technological change.”). Predicting these changes is impossible,
but offsets, particularly forest offsets, are the most cost-effective large-scale emissions
reductions currently available.
238 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BACKGROUND ON ESTABLISHING NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE
STANDARDS (NSPS) UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT 1–2 (2012), available at http://www.epa.gov/
airquality/cps/pdfs/111background.pdf (explaining how costs are considered under section 111).
239 See, e.g., EJ MATTERS, FACTSHEET: THE CAP AND TRADE CHARADE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 1–7,
available at http://www.ejmatters.org/docs/Cap-Trade_FACTSHEET.pdf (summarizing the
opposition of some environmental justice groups to both cap-and-trade and carbon offsets).
240 See, e.g., EJ MATTERS, THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT’S DECLARATION
AGAINST THE USE OF CARBON TRADING SCHEMES TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE, available at http://
www.ejmatters.org/docs/CA_EJ_Declaration_on_Carbon_Trading.pdf (stating the California
Environmental Justice Movement’s findings that carbon trading and offsets will not result in
reduced emissions).
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or impossible to implement. As lawsuits by California environmental justice
groups over that state’s decision to implement a cap-and-trade system
illustrate,241 it may be these groups, rather than industry, that are most likely
to challenge EPA regulations that include alternative tools.
It is important to understand and verify the actual impact of offsets or
biomass combustion on carbon concentrations and adjust policy
accordingly. Nevertheless, a policy pathway that leaves one or more of these
tools off the table entirely before they can be studied in practice is at least
less than ideal, and may be substantially more costly. To the extent that this
is true of a policy path led by EPA and the states, it is another in a list of
disadvantages of that path relative to a legislative path.242

C. States
Can the states provide a way out of this dilemma? To date, they have
been the leaders in U.S. climate policy,243 and that may not change even after
EPA implements CAA performance standards for major sectors of the
economy. States retain the freedom to pursue their own climate policies,
using whatever tools they determine are most effective, including statewide
cap-and-trade programs (like California) and, potential constitutional issues
aside, international forest offsets.
But this theoretical freedom is tempered in practice by interactions
with EPA’s program. Because states must comply with EPA’s guidelines and
with the limits of section 111 in doing so,244 tools that are unavailable to EPA
are similarly unavailable to states for the emissions reductions in-state
sources must make to comply with section 111 standards.245 Because of this,
states may decide that administratively costly offset programs are not worth
pursuing, and this will increase the costs (and possibly the stringency) of
these states’ programs.246 States without climate policies may also be less
likely to adopt them.

D. Implications of Limited Flexibility
The CAA is a valuable pathway to reducing greenhouse gas emissions,
despite its apparent inability to incorporate cost-effective extended

241
242

See, e.g., Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 206 Cal. App. 4th 1487 (2012).

This is not to suggest that the legislative path is ideal either. As the Waxman-Markey bill
illustrates, real-world federal carbon legislation is likely to be far from blackboard ideals and
full of carve-outs, exceptions, and other features that limit its cost-effectiveness. See H.R. 2454
11th Cong. 439, 944–945, 1390 (1st Sess. 2009).
243 See ANDREW AULISI ET AL., WORLD RES. INST., CLIMATE POLICY IN THE STATE LABORATORY:
HOW STATES INFLUENCE FEDERAL REGULATION AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
IN THE UNITED STATES 4–5 (2007), available at http://www.wri.org/publication/climate-policy-inthe-state-laboratory.
244 WANNIER ET AL., supra note 8, 13–14.
245 See id. at 1–3, 13–14.
246 See supra text accompanying notes 219–20.
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flexibility tools. Compliance with the Act, first of all, is required by law.247
Moreover, the CAA still appears capable, in the hands of a bold, smart EPA,
of achieving meaningful carbon reductions at modest cost over the short
term.248 The short term matters because no federal-level alternative is likely
to arise for some time. It is further likely that any new legislative policy that
does eventually emerge will be far from ideal (perhaps just as far as the CAA
appears to be) as a result of political compromise. Nevertheless, section 111
performance standards that cannot include extended flexibility, particularly
international forest offsets, appear to leave some of the best climate policy
tools off the table.
Can this problem be solved? In principle, yes. A minimally invasive
solution would be for Congress to amend the CAA to explicitly allow
extended flexibility (with appropriate verification requirements) in section
111 performance standards. But this seems unlikely given the current
political stalemate regarding passage of federal environmental legislation.249
The last significant changes to the CAA, in 1990, required years of debate
and major political compromise and resulted in the addition of multiple new
titles to the Act.250 Essentially, Congress passed major new environmental
legislation that was labeled as a set of amendments to an existing statute.251
The current makeup and level of debate in Congress makes it unlikely that
this would happen today.252 And even if Congress is capable of passing major
environmental legislation, it would be better off passing dedicated climate
legislation, not tweaking the existing CAA to make it better fit the GHG
problem. As noted at the outset, this too seems unlikely.253

247 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(2) (2006) (describing the EPA’s enforcement
power if an individual emitter or a state is out of compliance).
248 Richardson et al., Greenhouse Gas Regulation under the Clean Air Act: Structure, Effects,
and Implications of a Knowable Pathway, supra note 30, at 10115–16; see also Richardson et al.,
supra note 4, at 28.
249 See generally Carol A. Casazza Herman et al., Breaking the Logjam: Environmental
Reform for the New Congress and Administration, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2 (2008) (discussing
the “urgent need for innovative strategies for environmental protection that will break the
political logjam and meet environmental challenges that have become increasingly
complex”); see also Teresa B. Clemmer, Staving Off the Climate Crisis: The Sectoral Approach
Under the Clean Air Act., 40 ENVTL. L. 1125, 1135 (2010) (calling attention to legislative
gridlock in Congress, and noting that “nowhere is it more pronounced than in the context of
climate change”).
250 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Overview,
http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/overview.txt (last visited Mar. 14, 2012) (“By large votes, both the
House of Representatives (401-21) and the Senate (89-11) passed Clean Air bills that contained
the major components of the President’s proposals. Both bills also added provisions requiring
the phaseout of ozone-depleting chemicals, roughly according to the schedule outlined in
international negotiations (Revised Montreal Protocol). The Senate and House bills also added
specific research and development provisions, as well as detailed programs to address
accidental releases of toxic air pollutants.”).
251 See generally id.; ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR., ENVTL. LAW INST., AIR POLLUTION CONTROL AND
CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION LAW 16–17 (2d ed. 2010).
252 See Casazza Herman et al., supra note 249, at 1–2.
253 See supra Part I.
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E. Further Research
It is worth stressing again that the availability of extended flexibility
under CAA GHG regulation is seriously underexplored. This Article has
begun to address that gap, but it remains wide open. Substantial ambiguity
remains over core questions, such as EPA’s ability to use its categorization
powers to achieve Type 2 flexibility, and, more deeply, over the meaning and
implications of the “best system” language itself, upon which most
arguments in favor of flexibility depend. In addition, legal scholars with
expertise beyond environmental and administrative law have opportunities
to make valuable contributions. For example, the constitutionality of state
actions to include international offsets in their programs is unclear.
International and constitutional law scholars will also be needed to better
determine whether the CAA is compatible with international offsets.
Although it is likely that the courts and/or Congress will make the final
decision on many of the issues discussed in this Article, ample room remains
for further work to better understand the law as it stands. That work will be
valuable, both to EPA and to the states as they plan their regulatory
programs under section 111, and to industry as it attempts to predict what
those programs will require.

